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Defining the "Economic Interest"
in Minerals After
United States v. Swank
BY MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The concept of "economic interest" is the fundamental prin-
ciple governing taxation of the mineral industry: it is the touch-
stone which determines both the allocation of gross income, and
entitlement to either cost or percentage depletion;2 it is also a key
element in ascertaining whether a mineral interest has been sold
rather than leased.3 The term first appeared in the 1933 Supreme
Court decision of Palmer v. Bender,4 where the Court ascribed to
it a definition which has since been incorporated into the treas-
ury regulations as follows:
An economic interest is possessed in every case in which the
taxpayer has acquired by investment any interest in mineral in
place or standing timber and secures, by any form of legal rela-
tionship, income derived from the extraction of the mineral or
severance of the timber, to which he must look for a return of
his capital. 5
This definition generally remains the starting point for any dis-
cussion of economic interest. Yet, despite its seemingly concrete
language, the cases reveal that this traditional definition is fre-
quently very difficult to apply.
One reason for the difficulty in articulating a workable def-
inition is the divergent types of mineral interests against which
" Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, B.A., Rutgers College, 1971;
J.D., Boston College, 1974; LL.M., Boston University, 1979.
1 Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655
(1937); Helveringv. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U.S. 312 (1934).
2 Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956); Helvering v.
Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938); Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655.
3 Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
4 287 U.S. 551,557 (1933).
5 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1), T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 309,317.
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the definition must be applied. The substantive rights and con-
comitant risks of nonoperating interests are frequently so differ-
ent from those of operating interests that tests applicable to one
type of interest may be meaningless when applied to the other.
Unfortunately, the courts have not always clearly recognized this
problem. Consequently, courts consistently treat the terminology
of the traditional definition as a string of words of art, finding its
factors satisfied by ascribing to its terms meanings which no lexi-
cographer could fathom. Notwithstanding their consistent re-
statement of the'traditional definition and purposes of the deple-
tion allowance,6 courts with equal frequency conclude either
that no investment is necessary or that an investment in the min-
eral may be found in an investment in property which is recover-
able as an expense or through depreciation. Thus, in applying the
definition of an economic interest the courts, like Humpty
Dumpty, take the attitude, "When I use a word ... it means
just what I choose it to mean ... "7
Despite the elusiveness of a truly workable definition, the
courts have, with some exceptions, generally reached satisfactory
results in determining whether a taxpayer in fact has an eco-
nomic interest. One such exception encompasses operating inter-
ests in coal and certain other hard minerals. The problem is
manifest in two fairly typical arrangements in the coal indus-
try-contract mining and leases terminable on short notice with-
out cause. Although the question of whether a particular tax-
payer is a contract miner or a lessee remains a subject of litiga-
tion, the proper treatment of contract miners has generally been
considered to have been resolved by the Supreme Court in Par-
sons v. Smith8 and Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner,9
which held that contract miners have no economic interest in the
coal in place and thus are not entitled to depletion. On the other
hand, until the recent decision of the Supreme Court in United
6 See text accompanying note 49 infra for an example of the traditionally stated pur-
pose of the depletion allowance.
7 L. CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass in THE COMPLETE WoRcs OF LEIwIS
CARROLL 196 (1966).
8 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
9 380 U.S. 624 (1965).
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States v. Swank, 0 courts were divided as to whether a lessee un-
der a lease terminable by the lessor without cause on short notice
had such an economic interest. With Swank the Court resolved
this issue, holding that where the lessee would otherwise have
had an economic interest in the coal in place, the mere existence
of an unexercised termination clause will not deprive the lessee of
that economic interest.
This article will examine the definition of an economic inter-
est in light of the Swank decision, propose a definition of eco-
nomic interest which better comports with reality, particularly
when applied to operating interests in hard minerals, primarily
coal, and examine the continued validity of Parsons v. Smith and
Paragon Jewel Coal Co. under the proposed definition.
I. THE SWANK DECISION
United States v. Swank involved three separate refund suits,
consolidated for argument in both the Court of Claims and the
Supreme Court." The facts in each case were essentially the
same. Each taxpayer operated a coal mine under a written lease
and had the right to extract and sell the coal for his own account;
the lessor exercised no supervision of the operation, but received
a fixed royalty per ton of coal extracted. All of the leases pro-
vided for unilateral termination by either party without cause
upon thirty days' prior notice, but in no instance was the right of
termination exercised. The taxpayer in each case operated under
the lease for several years, in two of the three cases mining the
leased coal to exhaustion.
In each case the taxpayer claimed percentage depletion on
his gross income from mining, less royalties paid to the lessor.' 2
'0 101 S. Ct. 1931 (1981).
11 Swank v. United States, 602 F.2d 348 (Ct. Cl. 1976), affd, 101 S. Ct. 1931 (1981)
(also deciding Black Hawk Coal Corp. v. United States (Ct. CI. 1976) & Bull Run Mining
Co. v. United States (Ct. Cl. 1976)).
12 Depletion is generally allowed under I.R.C. § 611 (1976) with respect to "mines,
oil and gas wells, other natural deposits, and timber." I.R.C. § 612 (1976) provides that
the basis on which depletion is allowed is the adjusted basis of the property unless percent-
age depletion as provided in I.R.C. § 613 (1976) is elected.
Percentage depletion is allowable for coal at the rate of 10%. I.R.C. § 613(b)(4)
(1976). The specified percentage is applied against "the gross income from the property ex-
1981-82]
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The Commissioner disallowed the deduction, asserting that the
taxpayer had no economic interest in the coal in place. The gov-
ernment conceded, however, that each taxpayer would have had
an economic interest but for the termination provision and thus
would have been entitled to the depletion allowance. 13
The government advanced two theories to support its
position that terminability of the leases deprived the lessees of an
economic interest. First, it argued that the termination clause af-
forded the taxpayers a "mere economic advantage"-distin-
guished by the regulations from a depletable economic interest-
akin to the mining contractors in Parsons v. Smith and Paragon
Jewel Coal Co. 4 1Second, the government argued that "as a mat-
ter of 'practical economics' . . . the right to terminate gives the
lessor the only significant economic interest in the coal."' 5 The
premise underlying this argument was that the lessor retained the
cluding from such gross income an amount equal to any rents or royalties paid or incurred
by the taxpayer in respect of the property." I.R.C. § 613(a) (1976). For a general discus-
sion of the meaning of "gross income from the property," see Determination of Gross In-
come and Taxable Income From Oil and Gas Wells, OIL & GAS-NAT. RESOURCES (P-H)
2024 (1978), and Maxfield, Gross Income From Mining, OIL & GAS-NAT. RESoURCES
(P-H) 2034 (1979).
Depletion is to be equitably apportioned between the lessor and lessee under
I.R.C. § 611(b)(1) (1976). Lessees, however, were permitted to deduct depletion prior to
the enactment of the predecessor of I.R.C. § 611(b)(1) (1976). Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens
Co., 267 U.S. 364, 369 (1925).
13 602 F.2d at 349.
14 United States v. Swank, 101 S. Ct. at 1937. Treas. Beg. § 1.611-1(b) provides in
part:
A person who has no capital investment in the mineral deposit or standing
timber does not possess an economic interest merely because through a con-
tractual relation he possesses a mere economic or pecuniary advantage de-
rived from production. For example, an agreement between the owner of an
economic interest and another entitling the latter to purchase or process the
product upon production or entitling the latter to compensation for extrac-
tion or cutting does not convey a depletable economic interest.
Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b), T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 309, 317. The "mere economic advan-
tage" limitation imposed by the regulation arose from the Supreme Court's decision in
Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362, which held that a processor of wet gas had
no economic interest. See Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(m)-l(b) (1954). See text accompanying
notes 73-75 infra for a discussion of Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co. The example of a con-
tract entitling the taxpayer to "compensation for extraction" was added following the Su-
preme Court's decision in Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215. See Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b),
T.D. 6446, 1960-1 C.B. 208,211.
15 101 S. Ct. at 1937.
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right to the benefit of future increases in the market price of coal
through his ability to terminate the lease and negotiate a new
lease with another or the same lessee at a royalty commensurate
with the then-prevailing market price. Both of these arguments
were rejected by the Court, which held that the taxpayers had a
depletable economic interest.16
The Court distinguished Parsons v. Smith and Paragon Jewel
Coal Co. on the basis that the terminability of the contract
miners' agreements was not determinative in those cases. Al-
though terminability was enumerated in Parsons v. Smith as one
of seven factors indicating the lack of an economic interest, the
Swank Court concluded that the same result would have fol-
lowed in both Parsons v. Smith and Paragon Jewel Coal Co. ab-
sent terminability.17 As analyzed by the Swank Court, the distin-
guishing factor depriving the contract miners of a depletable eco-
nomic interest was that they were merely to mine the coal for de-
livery to the owner or lessee at a fixed price; the miners therefore
had neither any right to sell the coal to a third party after extrac-
tion nor any other interest in the coal before or after it was
mined.'8 Thus, because the contract miners looked solely to ful-
fillment of the contract terms, rather than to the sale of the coal,
for a return of their investment, they did not meet the Palmer v.
Bender test of an economic interest. 9 In contrast, the lessees in
Swank had a legal interest in the mineral both before and after it
was mined and were free to sell the coal at the market price. 20
The Court also rejected the government's second theory,
enumerating three reasons for doing so. First, on the basis that
the factors influencing the level of royalty payments were so nu-
merous that an increase in the market value of coal would not
necessarily result in the lessors' terminating the lease for the pur-
pose of renegotiating for a higher royalty, the Court concluded
that the lessees' interests were not economically illusory. 2' That
the lessor did not in fact retain control of the deposit was evi-
l" Id. at 1939.
17 Id. at 1937.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 1938.20 Id.
21 Id. at 1939.
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denced by the fact that the leases continued in force for many
years even though the value of the coal increased markedly.22
Thus the lessees met both halves of the test of an economic inter-
est under the regulations which require, first, that the taxpayer
have a capital interest in the mineral in place and, second, that
the taxpayer look only to the extraction and sale of the mineral
for a return of his capital.23
Second, the Court was influenced by the seeming unfairness
of penalizing the taxpayer by denying the deduction merely be-
cause he assumed the risk of termination, a risk which a lessee
under a long-term lease has not assumed, when in all other re-
spects the two were in the same position. The Court concluded
that it was unlikely that Congress intended to so penalize tax-
payers because of their unequal bargaining power. 2
Finally, and of most importance to the Court, considerations
of tax policy militated against the government's position. In anal-
yzing the policy underlying the percentage depletion allowance,
the Court in Swank finally acknowledged that the allowance is
not merely a capital recovery provision, but also a special benefit
to encourage the extraction of minerals.2 Consequently, there
should be no difference "whether the entire operation is con-
ducted by one taxpayer over a prolonged period or by a series of
taxpayers operating for successive shorter periods." According-
ly, the Court could find no logical reason to deny depletion to the
lessee under a lease terminable on short notice. In addition, to do
so would be contrary to the policy behind the percentage deple-
tion allowance since the result if the lessee were denied depletion
would be that no party would be entitled to the allowanceY
Dissenting, Justice White, joined by Justice Stewart, dis-
agreed with the majority's conclusion that the ownership of the
coal after extraction and the right to sell the coal at the market
price were sufficient to confer an economic interest on the les-
22 d.
23 Id. at 1937. See Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b), T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 309,317.
24 101 S. Ct. at 1939.
25 Id. at 1935.
27 Id. at 1939.
27 Id. at 1935-36.
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sees.s The dissent emphasized that the Parsons v. Smith multiple
factor test was not solely dependent on the marketing scheme
and, therefore, should not be so distinguished. 9 Rather, the dis-
sent accepted the position of the Internal Revenue Service that
the single factor of short notice terminability should be determi-
native, noting that such a position was entitled to deference as a
longstanding administrative interpretation of the regulations. o
Further, the dissenting opinion did not view actual con-
tinued operation under the lease as overcoming the lack of a legal
right to mine for more than thirty days.a' The lessees' "rights,"
therefore, whether to the mineral in place or to sell the extracted
mineral at the market price, were illusory because solely depen-
dent on the lessor's willingness to continue the lease.32 Such il-
lusory rights did not meet the Service's requirement of some en-
forceable expectation of continuity in mining rights as a prereq-
uisite for asserting an economic interest in the mineral in place. 3
While a narrow reading of Swank may confine its holding to
merely the terminability issue, the method of analysis used by the
Court-particularly its emphasis that furthering the policy be-
hind the percentage depletion allowance is relevant in determin-
ing whether the taxpayer has an economic interest-raises broad
questions concerning the viability of the traditional definition of
an economic interest. In analyzing the.interest of the taxpayers,
the Court did not directly apply the bifurcated test of the regula-
tions. Due to its policy orientation, the Court's analysis was con-
centrated instead on a modified version of the second half of that
test, finding an economic interest where the taxpayer derived in-
come from the extraction and sale of the mineral. Further, in dis-
2 Id. at 1939 (White, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 1944 (White, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 1940-42 (White, J., dissenting). This generally accepted doctrine was not
discussed in the majority opinion, which sub silencio overturned-in part-the definition
of an economic interest in Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b) (1). For the relevant text of Treas. Reg.
§ 1.611-1(b)(1), see text at note 5 supra. For a brief discussion of the weight to be accorded
treasury regulations and of the standards for overturning them, see McMahon, Defining
the "Acquisition" in B Reorganizations Through the Step Transaction Doctrine, 67 IowA
L. REv. 31, 57 n.85 (1981).
31 United States v. Swank, 101 S.Ct. at 1943-44 (White, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 1944 (White, J., dissenting).
33 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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tinguishing Parsons v. Smith, the Court failed to analyze fully
the effect of its holding on the first half of the test, requiring a
capital interest in the mineral in place. Indeed, the Court's ap-
proach was similar to that of Justice Stewart when he attempted
to analyze the concept of obscenity: 34 although it did not attempt
to fully define the substantive rights embraced by the term "eco-
nomic interest," the Court knew it when it saw it. Recognizing
the interest of the taxpayers in Swank as an economic interest,
however, effects a change in the substantive rights embraced by
the term which requires a redefinition. After Swank, the first
half of the traditional definition is of substantially diminished
importance and the second half of the definition, which pre-
viously evoked a less thorough examination than the first half of
the definition, ascends to primacy.
This article will examine the history of the statutory provi-
sions for depletion as well as the early cases from which evolved
the general language delineating the parameters for defining an
economic interest, for those cases contain the seeds of the confu-
sion over the definition. Only then can one understand that the
decision in Swank signals a change in the theoretical basis for de-
termining whether a taxpayer has an economic interest entitling
him to depletion, rather than merely resolving the issue of the ef-
fect upon depletion of termination clauses in mineral leases and
partially clarifying the relative importance of the seven factors in
Parsons v. Smith.
II. THE SEEDS OF CONFUSION: THE EARLY STATUTORY
PROVISIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEST
FOR AN ECONOMIC INTEREST
An allowance for depletion has been part of the modem in-
come tax laws from their inception. The Tariff Act of 1913 per-
mitted deduction of "a reasonable allowance for depletion of ores
34 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963). In the Jacobellis decision, Justice
Stewart, struggling with the definition of obscenity, stated:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand
to be embraced within that shorthand description and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligently doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion
picture involved in this case is not that.
[Vol. 70
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and all other natural deposits, not to exceed five percent of the
gross value at the mine of the output for the year for which the
computation is made."' ' The Revenue Act of 1916 extended de-
pletion to oil and gas wells and provided for depletion with re-
spect to mineral properties purchased prior to March 1, 1913 in
an aggregate amount not to exceed the fair market value of the
property as of that date. 36 The 1916 Act was intended to permit
only recoupment of cost, however, and limited aggregate deple-
tion of properties purchased after March 1, 1913 to an amount
equal to the taxpayer's cost basis. r Under these early statutes de-
pletion was truly akin to depreciation and the Supreme Court's
explanation of the purpose of depletion in United States v.
Ludey'8 accurately reflected the policy 'underlying the allow-
ance:
The depletion charge permitted as a deduction from the
gross income in determining the taxable income of mines for
any year represents the reduction in the mineral contents of the
reserves from which the product is taken. The reserves are
recognized as wasting assets. The depletion effected by oper-
ation is likened to the using up of raw material in making the
product of a manufacturing establishment. As the cost of the
raw material must be deducted from the gross income before
the net income can be determined, so the estimated cost of the
part of the reserve used up is allowed.
... The proviso limiting the amount of the deduction for
depletion to the amount of the capital invested shows that the
deduction is to be regarded as a return of capital, not as a spe-
cial bonus for enterprise and willingness to assume risks.1
The Revenue Act of 1918 began an evolution in the purpose
3 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II G(b), 38 Stat. 114, 172-73 (applicable to corpora-
tions); Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II B, 38 Stat. 114, 167 (applicable to individuals).
36 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463 H8 5(a)Eighth, 12(a)Second, 39 Stat. 756, 759, 767-
68.
37 Id. The 1913 Act, on the other hand, did not necessarily ensure full recovery of
cost because of the limitation of depletion annually allowable to 5% of the value of the
output; cost in excess of that amount was not recoverable. Tariff Act of 1913, cl. 16, § II
G(b), 38 Stat. 114, 172-73; Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II B, 38 Stat. 114, 167. See also
Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103,113-14 (1916).
18 274 U.S. 295 (1927).
39 Id. at 302-03.
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of the depletion allowance by liberalizing the amount of aggre-
gate depletion allowable as follows:
[I]n the case of mines, oil and gas wells, discovered by the tax-
payer, on or after March 1, 1913, and not acquired as the re-
sult of purchase of a proven tract or lease, where the fair mar-
ket value of the property is materially disproportionate to the
cost, the depletion allowance shall be based upon the fair mar-
ket value of the property at the date of discovery, or within
thirty days thereafter .... 40
Quite clearly, the intended effect of this change was to stimulate
exploration and development of new mineral properties. 4' No
longer was the depletion deduction necessarily akin to the cost of
goods sold or the allowance for depreciation. While the pur-
chaser of a proven property was allowed depletion based on
cost-presumably equal to the fair market value at the date of
purchase, the discoverer of minerals, oil, or gas was entitled to a
deduction which could be many times his cost. Thus, there was a
marked difference in purpose between the March 1, 1913 fair
market value depletion allowed by the Revenue Act of 1916 and
the generally applicable discovery value depletion of the Rev-
enue Act of 1918. While the former provision was quite possibly
40 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a)(10), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066-68 (applicable to
individuals); Revenue Act of 1918, oh. 18, § 234(a) (9), 40 Stat. 1057, 1077-78 (applicable
to corporations).
41 Discovery value depletion originated in the Senate version of the Revenue Bill of
1918. The rationale was explained as follows:
The prospector for mines or oil and gas frequently expends many years
and much money in fruitless search. When he does locate a productive prop-
erty and comes to settle it seems unwise and unfair that his profit be taxed at
the maximum rate as if it were ordinary income attributable to the normal
activities of a single year. To stimulate prospecting and exploration, the
committee has limited the surtax to 20 per cent of the selling price in the case
of a bona fide sale of mines, oil or gas wells where the principal value was
demonstrated by prospecting, explohing, or discovery work done by the tax-
payer.... Special provision is also made for increased depletion allowance
in the case of such properties.
S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1918), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 117, 120-
121. See C. GALviN, THE DEDUCTION Foa PERCENTAGE AND EXPLORATION AND DEVELOP-
!dENT ComS, 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86TH CONG., IST SESS., TAX REVISION
COMPENDIUM 933, 942 (Comm. Print 1959); Austin, Percentage Depletion: Its Back-
ground and Legislative History, 21 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 22, 25-26 (1952); Baker, The
Nature of Depletable Income, 7 TAX L. REv. 267, 270-71 (1952).
[Vol. 70
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intended to avoid any issues of unconstitutionality, 42 the latter
provision is an excellent example of an early "tax expenditure"
item.
43
Discovery value depletion proved to be unworkable for sev-
eral reasons, including the difficulty of estimating the value of
the deposit and determining who was a discoverer of an un-
proven reserve.44 Because these problems were particularly acute
with respect to oil and gas, the Revenue Act of 1926 revised the
depletion allowance as applicable to those resources. 45 Discovery
value depletion for oil and gas wells was abandoned, and in its
place was substituted a flat percentage deduction of 27.5% of the
gross income from the property. 4 Although the depletion allow-
able annually was limited to fifty percent of taxable income and
reduced the taxpayer's basis in the property (although not below
zero), the limitation on aggregate depletion deductions was re-
moved. The Revenue Act of 1932 accorded similar treatment, at
lower rates of depletion, to metals, coal, and sulphur.47 Percent-
age depletion was subsequently extended to a wide range of nat-
ural resources. 4"
42 Cf. S. REP. No. 793, pt. 1, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B.
(pt. 2) 28, 30 (fixing basis for gain on property acquired before March 1, 1913, as the fair
market value on that date).
43 For a brief explanation of the definition of a tax expenditure, see Surrey & Mc-
Daniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REv. 679, 682-88 (1976). The excess of percentage depletion has been treated as a
tax expenditure under the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297. See, e.g., Budget of the United States Government,
1979, Special Analysis G, Table G-1. The theory of discovery depletion is implicit in per-
centage depletion. See Baker & Griswold, Percentage Depletion-A Correspondence, 64
HAnv. L. REV. 361,370 (1951).
44 S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 332,
345-46; Austin, supra note 41, at 26-27.
45 H.R. REP. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2)
361, 362-63; S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2)
332,345-46.
46 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 204(b)(2), 214(a)(9), 234(a)(8), 44 Stat. 9, 16, 26-
27, 41-43. Discovery value depletion continued to apply to other natural resources despite
administrative difficulties.
47 Revenue Act of 1932, cl. 209, § 114(b)(4), 47 Stat. 169, 202-03. The rate of per-
centage depletion was 5% for coal mines, 15% for metal mines, and 23% for sulphur
mines.
48 I.R.C. § 613(b) (1976); Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 183, § 319, 65 Stat.
452, 497-98; Revenue Act of 1944, ch. 63, § 124, 58 Stat. 24, 44-46; Revenue Act of 1942,
ch. 619, § 145, 56 Stat. 798, 840.
1981-82]
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court long failed to recognize
clearly the essential change in the nature and purpose of deple-
tion. As a result the Court-and lower courts following its lead-
almost invariably began any analysis of whether a particular tax-
payer had an economic interest with the maxim that the purpose
of the depletion allowance was to permit the taxpayer to recoup
his investment in the mineral, and that "the granting of an arbi-
trary deduction... of a percentage of gross income was in the
interest of convenience and in no way altered the fundamental
theory of the allowance."49
The continuing validity of this maxim has not been critically
examined by the Court because it has long been considered a
truism. It finds its seeds in United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil
Co. ,50 where the Court, in analyzing whether the change from
discovery value to percentage depletion changed the prior rule
requiring capitalized intangible drilling costs to be recovered
through depletion rather than depreciation, stated that the
change in the method of calculating depletion was not intended
to change the theory of depletion.51 That is quite true; the change
from discovery value depletion to percentage depletion occurred
long after the depletion allowance had ceased to be merely a
method of cost recovery. The metamorphosis in the purpose of
the depletion allowance was effected, first, by the allowance of
discovery value depletion as opposed to cost depletion and, later,
by the total abandonment of any limit on aggregate depletion. It
is clear that the change to discovery value depletion was intended
to change the purpose underlying the depletion allowance, and,
regardless of intended purpose, the failure to limit aggregate de-
pletion clearly changes its effect from a method of cost recovery
to a preferential exemption from taxation of a portion of the in-
come derived from the extraction of natural resources. The de-
scription of the depletion allowance in United States v. Ludey
was therefore totally outdated by 1932. Nevertheless, until the
49 Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. at 267. See Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Com-
missioner, 326 U.S. 599, 602-03 (1946); Usibelli v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 539, 542 (9th
Cir. 1955). But see Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. at 312.
50 288 U.S. 459 (1933).
51 Id. at 467.
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recent indications in Swank that the allowance serves a broader
purpose, 52 courts have struggled to analyze depletion as a capital
recovery concept, something that percentage depletion simply is
not.
The shibboleth that percentage depletion is merely a capital
recovery mechanism has tainted the formulation of the test of an
economic interest, beginning with the landmark case of Palmer
v. Bender. While that decision has been rightly hailed as a
triumph of "factualism" over the conceptualism of applying "ab-
struse property law" to determine who was entitled to the deple-
tion allowance,- the Court failed to break away from the con-
ceptualism of depletion as a capital recovery provision, despite its
seeming acknowledgment that the policy behind percentage de-
pletion was to encourage the discovery of oil.4
Palmer v. Bender involved taxpayers who conveyed all of
their rights to a portion of a tract under an oil lease in exchange
for a cash payment, an additional $1,000,000 payable out of one-
half of the first oil produced, and an excess royalty of one-eighth
of all oil produced.- The issue was whether the transaction was a
lease or a sale. If a lease, the taxpayer would be entitled to de-
duct discovery value depletion; if a sale, only cost recovery
would be allowed.
The Court rejected the government's argument that concepts
of property law were determinative, consistent with its earlier
decision in Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co.,- where it permitted
depletion to a lessee. Rather, the Court formulated its now clas-
sic test for determining entitlement to depletion:
The language of the statute is broad enough to provide, at
least, for every case in which the taxpayer has acquired, by in-
vestment, any interest in the oil in place, and secures, by any
52 See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra for a discussion of the Court's analysis in
Swank of the policy underlying the depletion allowance.
5 Sneed, The Economic Interest-An Expanding Concept, 35 TEX. L. REv. 307,
312-13 (1957).
54 Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. at 558.
5 Id. at 553-54.
56 267 U.S. 364 (1925).
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form of legal relationship, income derived from the extraction
of the oil, to which he must look for a return of his capital.57
The Court held that the taxpayers in Palmer v. Bender met
the requirement of a capital investment in the oil in place even
though they had not made an actual cash investment. Resorting
to a legal fiction, the Court found that, consonant with the pol-
icy of percentage depletion to encourage the discovery of oil, the
statute treated the value of the oil at the date of discovery as the
investment. Since at the time of discovery the taxpayers had
"complete legal control of the oil in place," they had "acquired
an economic interest in it which represented their capital invest-
ment and was subject to depletion under the statute." 59 There has
been no further significant critical judicial examination of the
"investment" requirement since Palmer v. Bender, and it has be-
come an extraneous word in the first part of the definition of an
economic interest. Consequently, where there is an interest in
the mineral in place, the first half of the test is met, notwith-
standing the absence of any actual cash investment. 60 On the
other hand, where there is no interest in the mineral in place, a
related capitalized cash expenditure, even though an investment
related to the extraction of the mineral, cannot give rise to an
economic interest. 61
57 Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. at 557.
5 Id.
59 Id.
60 Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, illustrates the
anomaly of the continued justification of the depletion allowance as a recovery of capital
investment:
An allowance for depletion... is based on the theory that the extraction of
minerals gradually exhausts the capital investment in the mineral deposit.
Presently, the depletion allowance is a fixed percentage of gross income
which Congress allows to be excluded; this exclusion is designed to permit a
recoupment of the owner's capital investment in the minerals so that when
the minerals are exhausted the capital is unimpaired. The present allow-
ance, however, bears little relationship to the capital investment, and the
taxpayer is not limited to a recoupment of his original investment. The al-
lowance continues so long as minerals are extracted, and even though no
money was actually invested in the deposit.
Id. at 312. See text accompanying notes 81-84 infra for a discussion of Southwest Explor-
ation Co. See also Casey, The Economic Interest-Play It Again, Sam, 24 TAx LAw. 129,
136-37 (1970).
61 Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (movable equipment); Helvering v. Bankline Oil
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The criteria actually utilized by the Court to determine whe-
ther the taxpayer has an interest in minerals in place are elusive
and amorphous.62 This difficulty is partly a creature of the stat-
ute that spawned it-section 611 grants the depletion allowance
"according to the peculiar conditions in each case." It is also a
child, however, of the blending of the two prongs of the eco-
nomic interest test of Palmer v. Bender and the regulations.
While the first half of the test requires an interest in the mineral
in place, the second half of the test requires that the taxpayer
look solely to income from the extraction of the mineral to recoup
his capital investment. This requires not only that the taxpayer's
capital investment be recouped from income actually derived
from extraction and sale of the mineral,1 but also that there be
no other possible source from which such income can be de-
rived.6 Since there is in fact no need for a capital investment, the
test at first seems paradoxical. Thus, a better statement of the
test would be that the depletion allowance is available with re-
spect to income derived from the extraction and sale of a mineral
deposit in which the taxpayer has an interest in place, but it is
not available with respect to income so derived if the taxpayer's
right to income can be satisfied by income from another source.66
Co., 303 U.S. 362 (processing plant); Constantino v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.
1971) (movable equipment); United States v. Wade, 381 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1967) (mov-
able and immovable strip mining equipment); McCall v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 699
(4th Cir. 1963) (movable equipment, deductible development expense, depreciable im-
movable improvements); Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 366 F.2d 1007
(Ct. Cl. 1966) (processing plant); CBN Corp. v. United States, 364 F.2d 393 (Ct. Cl.
1966) (processing plant). But see Winters Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 995 (5th
Cir. 1974) (discussed in text accompanying note 141 infra); Victory Sand & Concrete, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 407 (1974) (investment in riparian land essential to dredging
sand and gravel from river supported economic interest in sand and gravel despite absence
of exclusive legal right to remove sand and gravel from publicly owned river bed); Oil City
Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 31 (1959) (same).
62 See generally Sneed, supra note 53, at 334-36.
63 I.R.C. § 611(a) (1976). See Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 348
F.2d 921, 925-26 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
'4 Compare Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 with Signal Gasoline Corp.
v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 657 (1936). See
Sneed, supra note 53, at 320-27.
65 Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. at 635; Anderson v. Helver-
ing, 310 U.S. at 412-13. See Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. at 225.
66 Other restatements of the test have also been advanced. One alternative is that the
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Although the test for an economic interest is clearly stated as
a two-pronged conjunctive test, considerations of the source of
return often overlap with the determination of whether the tax-
payer has the requisite interest in the minerals in place. Illustra-
tive of such a blending is the analysis used by the Court in Kirby
Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner" to determine whether a net
profits interest was subject to depletion. Although the Commis-
sioner conceded that the lessor taxpayer's royalty income based
on gross receipts from oil extracted by the lessee was subject to
depletion, he argued that a net profits interest did not represent
an interest in the mineral in place. The Court concluded that a
net profits royalty was theoretically no different from a gross re-
ceipts royalty, since the source of both payments was the pro-
ceeds from the sale of oil; consequently, title to the oil in place
was not necessary to establish the existence of an economic inter-
est.61
That title to the oil in place was not a requisite for establish-
ing an economic interest certainly was not new with Kirby Pe-
troleum Co. Both Palmer v. Bender and Lynch v. Alworth-
Stephens Co. had clearly dispensed with such a formalistic test.
However, the Court's approach in Kirby Petroleum Co., finding
an interest in the mineral in place by reference to the source of
return, was a departure from the tests used in those earlier cases,
which determined the requisite interest in the mineral based
receipt of income from the extraction and sale of the mineral must diminish the value of
the taxpayer's capital interest in property. See Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration
Co., 350 U.S. at 316; Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. at 603. One com-
mentator has suggested that Southwest Exploration Co. warrants not only a restatement
of the income test, but an entirely new test based solely on "income": "The 'interest' in
production and sale is ipso facto, the 'interest' in the mineral in place-without produc-
tion and sale there is no income, no depletion and no depletion allowance." Casey, supra
note 60, at 136-37. Thus, if the receipt of income from production diminishes the present
value of future income from production, the taxpayer has an economic interest. Id. at 137-
38. This test is also suggested by Kirby Petroleum Co.
67 326 U.S. 599 (1946).
68 Id. at 604. The Court stated that the "[1]essor's possibility of return depends upon
oil extraction and ends with exhaustion of the supply. Economic interest does not mean
title to the oil in place but the possibility of profit from that economic interest dependent
solely upon the extraction and sale of the oil." Id.
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upon the lessor's or lessee's control over the mineral. w There, the
right to extract the mineral and reduce it to possession and
ownership had been sufficient, even absent actual ownership of
the mineral in the ground.70 A similar test could easily have been
applied in Kirby Petroleum Co. Because the lessor is the source of
the lessee's control and the lessee's control is based upon compli-
ance with the terms of the lease, 71 the lessor clearly has retained
control over the mineral deposit at the same time as the lessee.
Such was the logic applied in Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commis-
sioner,72 decided after Kirby, holding that a net profits interest,
even though not coupled with a royalty as it had been in Kirby
Petroleum Co., was an economic interest.
69 The Supreme Court stated in Palmer v. Bender:
That the allowance for depletion is not made dependent upon the par-
ticular legal form of the taxpayer's interest in the property to be depleted
was recognized by this Court in Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co .... The
statute made no specific reference to lessees.... But this Court held that
regardless of the technical ownership of the ore before severence, the tax-
payer, by his lease, had acquired legal control of a valuable economic inter-
est in the ore capable of realization as gross income by the exercise of his
mining rights under the lease.
287 U.S. at 557. The Court relied on Barnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, for the proposition
that a lessor is entitled to depletion on royalties received, and allowed depletion to the les-
see-sublessor taxpayers in Palmer v. Bender. 287 U.S. at 557.
70 Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. at 370.
71 Under the doctrine of independent covenants the lessor's remedy for the lessee's
breach of the covenants of a mining lease is an action for damages, unless there is an ex-
press forfeiture clause in the lease. 3 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND., AMERICAN LAW OF MIN-
ING § 16.78 (1980) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN LAW OF MINING]. Where an oil and gas
lease is involved, the prevailing view appears to be that if damages are inadequate the les-
sor can obtain cancellation of the lease. R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 8.10-
8.11 (1971).
72 328 U.S. 25 (1946). The Supreme Court stated as to the economic interest in this
case:
Since lessors as well as lessees and other transferees of the right to ex-
ploit the land for oil may retain for themselves through their control over the
exploration of the land valuable benefits arising from and dependent upon
the extraction of the oil, Congress provided as early as the Revenue Act of
1918 for equitable apportionment of the depletion allowance between them
to correct what was said to be an existing inequality in the law or its admin-
istration.
Id. at 33-34 (footnotes omitted). In this case, the assignor of the petitioner before assign-
ment had an economic interest in the oil in place through its control over extraction. Un-




The difficulty in considering the source of income to deter-
mine whether the taxpayer has an interest in the mineral in place
is illustrated by Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co. ,73 decided eight
years prior to Kirby Petroleum Co. The taxpayer in Bankline Oil
Co., pursuant to an agreement with the well owners, processed
natural gas to remove the oil. The taxpayer paid the producers a
royalty of one-third of gross receipts from the sale of the products
derived from the purchased gas. It was clear that, but for the ex-
traction and sale of the mineral product, the taxpayer would
have had no income. Furthermore, because the royalty resulted
in the taxpayer paying less than the fair market value for the un-
processed wet gas, the extra profit resulting from the "dis-
count"-the only portion of its income on which the taxpayer
claimed depletion-apparently resulted from some special rela-
tionship to the extraction and sale of the gas. Nevertheless, the
Court held that the taxpayer did not have an economic interest,
coining the "mere economic advantage" test now embraced in
the regulations:74
But the phrase "economic interest" is not to be taken as em-
bracing a mere economic advantage derived from production,
through a contractual relation to the owner, by one who has no
capital investment in the mineral deposit....
... [A]part from its contracts with producers, respondent
had no interest in the producing wells or in the wet gas in
place.75
The Court examined all of the taxpayer's expenditures and, find-
ing that they were for equipment and facilities to deliver and
process gas rather than for an interest in the gas, held that the
taxpayer had no capital investment in the mineral in place.
Under the Kirby Petroleum Co. source-of-income analysis,
however, the taxpayer in Bankline Oil Co. could probably be
said to have income derived from the extraction and sale of the
gas to the extent that the royalty paid did not equal the fair mar-
73 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
74 Treas. Beg. § 1.611-1(b), T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 309, 317 (The text of § 1.611-
1(b) is set forth in part at note 14supra.).
75 303 U.S. at 367.
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ket value of the gas. 76 When the deposit was exhausted the tax-
payer would be compelled to seek new resources on the open
market. If the production of the wells in question were reduced,
the taxpayer's income would have been reduced by more than
the lost profits attributable to processing an equal amount of wet
gas purchased at fair market value. Therefore, the source of the
taxpayer's profit attributable to the discounted purchase price
was arguably the extraction and sale of the mineral rather than
its purchase and sale, even though the balance was clearly de-
rived from the resale of a processed mineral purchased after ex-
traction. Thus, although the distinction between profits arising
from extraction and sale of a mineral and profits arising from
purchase and sale of a mineral is a crucial one which defeats
many spurious claims of an economic interest, 77 it fails to provide
the ultimate answer in Bankline Oil Co. To determine whether a
taxpayer has an economic interest solely on the basis of the source
of income is essentially to abandon both the requirement that the
taxpayer have had some role in the exploration or development of
the deposit-crudely contained in the first half of the test of an
economic interest-and the requirement, however ephemeral, of
an interest in the mineral in place.78 This alternative has no clear
tie to the policy basis behind percentage depletion. 79
To avoid this problem courts must revert to the first half of
the definition of an economic interest, as did the Court in Bank-
line Oil Co. The difficulty with this formulation of the test is that
the "capital investment" requirement is essentially meaningless
because no true capital investment, in the form of an expendi-
76 See Signal Gasoline Corp. v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 728; Sneed, supra note 53, at
321-22.
77 See G.C.M. 22730,1941-1 C.B. 214.
78 That this goal was only crudely served by the first half of the traditional definition
of an economic interest is illustrated by the allowance, prior to the enactment of I.R.C. §
636 (1976), of a depletion deduction in a so-called "ABC" transaction to C, the purchaser
of the retained production payment. See Hambrick, Another Look at Some Old Prob-
lems-Percentage Depletion and the ABC Transaction, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 44-52
(1965).
79 At least one commentator has suggested that the sole test for an economic interest
and, hence, entitlement to the depletion allowance should be the source of income. The
commentator acknowledges, however, the possible conflict with Bankline Oil Co. Casey,
supra note 60, at 137-38.
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ture, is necessary. A more suitable means of avoiding the finding
of an economic interest in a situation not warranted by the policy
underlying depletion, at least on the facts of the cases presently
under discussion, lies in application of the control test. For
example, although the taxpayer in Bankline Oil Co. had contrac-
tual rights to the gas once it was extracted by the producer, he
had no control over the extraction of the mineral.80 Therefore,
exploration and discovery of new deposits would not be directly
encouraged by allowing a depletion allowance to such a tax-
payer.
The significance of control over the deposit was highlighted
in Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co.,81 the first Su-
preme Court decision, and still one of a few decisions by a court
of any level, holding that a taxpayer without an actual in-
vestment who had neither a fee nor a leasehold interest in the
mineral deposit itself nevertheless had an economic interest. The
issue in Southwest Exploration Co. was whether littoral land
owners who granted an operating company rights to whipstock
drill from their land to extract offshore deposits of oil were en-
titled to depletion against payments to them of 24.5 % of the net
profits. Under California law, offshore drilling was permitted
only from wells drilled on filled land or slant drilled from upland
sites. The operating company was required to provide evidence
of the availability of the upland drilling site as a prerequisite to
being awarded a bid. The Court characterized the upland
owners' participation as the contribution of the "use of their land
in return for rental based on the share of net profits" and "an in-
vestment in the oil in place stifficient to establish their economic
interest." 2
The upland landowners, however, did not necessarily make
an investment of capital the return of which could be realized
only through depletion. They merely permitted the use of their
land. If the original purchase price of their land did not reflect a
premium arising from the value of controlling offshore drilling,
any diminution in value caused by the depletion of the offshore
oil would have been against unrealized appreciation in value.
80 303 U.S. at 368.
81 350 U.S. 308 (1956).
8 2 Id. at 316.
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Thus, diminution in value due solely to the extraction of oil
would not have reduced the value of the land below the purchase
price, and there was therefore no investment to be recoupled.83
If, on the other hand, the upland owners had paid a premium for
the land due to its control over the ability to extract the offshore
oil, there would have been a true investment.
This distinction, however, did not concern the Court. Even
though there was no indication that the upland owners realized
any diminution in value below purchase price by reason of the
extraction of oil from whipstock wells drilled on their lands, their
control over drilling was the key element in the Court's decision:
We decide only that where, in the circumstances of this case, a
party essential to the drilling for and extraction of oil has made
an indispensable contribution of the use of real property adja-
cent to the oil deposits in return for a share in the net profits
from the production of oil, that party has an economic interest
which entitles him to depletion on the income thus received.M
Thus, while the "contribution" of the upland owners was not
necessarily a capital investment in the traditional sense, it is clear
that such a contribution is not a prerequisite to obtaining an eco-
nomic interest. Southwest Exploration Co. therefore emphasized
the unique control of extraction held by the upland owners, a
83 This is, of course, merely another example of the basic theoretical difficulty with
percentage depletion, the implicit depletion of the discovery value of the deposit rather
than the cost. See text accompanying note 46 supra for a discussion of the change from dis-
covery value depletion to percentage depletion. Dean Griswold's comments on this point
are particularly apt:
You say that percentage depletion is necessary to enable the industry to pre-
serve its "capital." But this is obviously using capital in a double sense, and
in a sense which is not applicable to other taxpayers. For other taxpayers,
that capital, recoverable through depreciation, or on sale, or otherwise, is
their investment in the property. Only in the oil business do "discoveries" be-
come capital for tax purposes. Frankly, I find some trouble seeing why this
should be so.
Baker & Griswold, supra note 43, at 370.
It is generally antithetical to our tax system to permit a deduction for a loss of un-
realized gain. See I.R.C. §§ 165(b), 166(b), 167(g) (1976) (limiting loss, bad debt, and de-
preciation deductions to the taxpayer's adjusted basis under I.R.C. § 1011 (1976), the
starting point for which is generally the taxpayer's original cost, I.R.C. § 1012 (1976)).
84 350 U.S. at 317.
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control usually held only by owners, lessors and lessees of the
mineral deposit itself.
A. The Impact of the Contract Miner Cases on the Palmer v.
Bender Test
Prior to Parsons v. Smith, there was substantial doubt re-
garding whether a contract miner had an economic interest.
Many decisions held that he did have an economic interest,s but
the import of the contract miner decisions prior to Parsons v.
Smith is confusing, primarily because the Service often argued
that a contract miner had an economic interest, thereby requir-
ing the lessee or owner to deduct payments to the miner from the
gross income from the property prior to computing his depletion
allowance.8 In other instances, however, the Service argued that
the contract miner had no economic interest.8 7 The distinguish-
ing factor appears to have been whether the contract miner had
the right to remove a substantial part of the mineral deposit.8
In G.C.M. 26290,11 the Service followed Eastern Coal Corp.
v. Yoke9o and held that the right to receive "a specified amount
85 Stilwell v. United States, 250 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1957); Commissioner v. Hamill
Coal Corp., 239 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1956), rev'g, 14 T.C.M. 218 (1955); Usibelli v. Com-
missioner, 229 F.2d 539; Commissioner v. Mammoth Coal Co., 229 F.2d 535 (3d Cir.
1955), rev'g, 22 T.C. 571 (1954); Commissioner v. Gregory Run Coal Co., 212 F.2d 52
(4th Cir. 1954), vacating and remanding 19 T.C. 501 (1952); Virginia B. Coal Co. v.
Commissioner, 25 T.C. 899 (1956); Ruston v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 284 (1952). See
Weirton Ice & Coal Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1956). Contra
Morrisdale Coal Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 208 (1952).
86 Commissioner v. Hamill Coal Corp., 239 F.2d 347 (stripping contracts for 10-
and 12-year terms); Commissioner v. Mammoth Coal Co., 229 F.2d 535 (stripping con-
tract for indefinite term); Commissioner v. Gregory Run Coal Co., 212 F.2d 52 (stripping
contract for all coal under particular tract); Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.
528 (1957), affd in part, rev'd in part, 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959) (stripping contract for
term of one year, renewable); Ruston v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 284 (stripping contract
coterminous with lease); Morrisdale Coal Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 208
(stripping contract for term of two years).
87 Weirton Ice & Coal Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 531 (contract to mine
amount demanded by owner); Usibelli v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 539 (contract to mine
fixed tonnage); Eastern Coal Corp. v. Yoke, 67 F. Supp. 166 (N.D.W. Va. 1946) (contract
for minimum tonnage).
88 Compare cases cited in note 86 supra with cases cited in note 87 supra.
89 1950-1 C.B. 42, 44, declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 70-277, 1970-1 C.B. 280.
90 67 F. Supp. 166 (N.D.W. Va. 1946).
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per ton of mineral produced may constitute a right to share in
production which marks ownership of a depletable economic in-
terest in the mineral in place"'91 by the contract miner. The right
to a fixed sum per ton of coal mined and delivered met the second
half of the test for an economic interest in that the contract miner
was required to "look for his compensation solely to the extrac-
tion and sale of the mineral." 92 To meet the first half of the test,
i.e., that the contract miner acquire a capital interest in the min-
eral in place, the contract could not be terminable at will or upon
relatively nominal-less than one year-notice. 93 This distinction
is reasonably consonant with the control theory for analyzing the
first half of the Palmer v. Bender definition of an economic inter-
est. Although the Tax Court consistently held that the miner's
right to a fixed payment per ton precluded the finding that the
miner held an economic interest,94 the courts of appeals followed
G.C.M. 26290.95
Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Parsons v. Smith
and Paragon Jewel Coal Co., the primary issue in so-called con-
tract miner cases is to determine whether the operator is a con-
tract miner or a lessee. If the operator is a contract miner, he has
no economic interest, regardless of the term of the contract, and
therefore no depletion allowance is available.96 A lessee, on the
other hand, has an economic interest, and the depletion allow-
ance is available. 97
91 G.C.M. 26290, 1950-1 C.B. 42,44.
92 Id. at 46.
13 Id. at 45-46.
94 Compare Mammoth Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 571 (1954), rev'd, 229
F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1956); Gregory Run Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 501 (1952), va-
cated and remanded, 212 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1954), and Morrisdale Coal Mining Co. v.
Commissioner, 19 T.C. 208 with Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 528 and Vir-
ginia B. Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 899. But see Weirton Ice & Coal Supply Co.
v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 374 (1955), rev'd, 231 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1956).
95 See cases cited at notes 85 and 94 supra for instances in which the courts of appeals
followed G.C.M. 26290.
96 Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. at 638; Parsons v. Smith, 359
U.S. at 224-26.
97 Compare Thornberry Constr. Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d 346 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
with Douglas Coal Co. v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 322 (N.D. W. Va. 1977) and Boll-
ing v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 754 (1962). In Thornberry Constr. Co., the taxpayer-lessee
strip-mined coal under a lease requiring him to fill the requirements of a third party desig-
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Precisely what contractual terms characterized a contract
miner, as opposed to a lessee, remained somewhat unclear for a
short period. The seven factors indicating that the operator was a
contract miner without an economic interest enumerated by the
Court in Parsons v. Smith were
nated by the lease. The lessee independently negotiated a long-term requirements contract
prior to the execution of the lease. The court found it irrelevant that the lessor would not
have executed the lease if the sales contract had not been executed and held that the lessee
was a true lessee having an economic interest and entitled to depletion.
What distinguishes this case from Parsons v. Smith, supra, and Paragon
Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, (and from
other cases cited by the defendant) is that, as a matter of form, of substance,
and of economic reality, the lease and assignment conferred upon plaintiff
the rights to mine coal and to sell that coal, at whatever price it could obtain
therefor, to an independent, unrelated, third party (albeit a valued custo-
mer of AMAX itself).
576 F.2d at 353 (emphasis in original).
In Bolling v. Commissioner the taxpayer strip mined coal under a lease, termina-
ble on 30 days' prior notice, in which the lessor reserved the right to purchase all coal
mined at a "price ... to be mutually agreed upon between the Lessor and the Lessee." 37
T.C. at 757. The lessor in fact purchased all coal production and retained extensive con-
trol over the method of operation. The court concluded that Parsons v. Smith could not be
distinguished and held that the taxpayer did not have an economic interest.
Here... the petitioners engaged in their strip-mining operation under
the contract completely subject to the will of Clinchfield, which had the
right at any time to cancel the contract without cause upon the giving of 30
days' written notice. The language in the cancellation clause is unambig-
uous, and there is no merit in petitioners' argument seeking to distinguish
the cancellation clause in this case from that involved in the Parsons and
Stallard cases....
Moreover, the 30-day cancellation clause is inconsistent with the peti-
tioners' argument that they obtained a leasehold interest in the coal in place
under their contract with Clinchfield....
However, insofar as the contract provisions are concerned it would not
be exactly correct to say, as was said in Parsons and Stallard that petitioners
agreed to look only to the landowners for payment. Presumably Clinchfield
could refuse to exercise its option or there could be failure to mutually agree
as to price and there seems to be no provision forbidding sales of mined coal
to third parties.
But ... Cecil W. Boiling who negotiated the contract for the partner-
ship testified it was his understanding that Clinchfield would take all of the
coal at a price in line with what Clinchfield was paying other strippers in
the area .... Under the circumstances we feel the absence of a binding con-
tract compelling petitioners to look only to Clinchfield's payments for com-




(1) that petitioners' investments were in their equipment, all of
which was movable-not in the coal in place; (2) that their in-
vestments in equipment were recoverable through deprecia-
tion-not depletion; (3) that the contracts were completely
terminable without cause on short notice; (4) that the land-
owners did not agree to surrender and did not actually surren-
der to petitioners any capital interest in the coal in place; (5)
that the coal at all times, even after it was mined, belonged en-
tirely to the landowners, and that petitioners could not sell or
keep any of it but were required to deliver all that they mined
to the landowners; (6) that petitioners were not to have any
part of the proceeds of the sale of the coal, but, on the con-
trary, they were to be paid a fixed sum for each ton mined and
delivered, which was, as stated in Huss, agreed to be in "full
compensation for the full performance of all work and for the
furnishing of all [labor] and equipment required for the work";
and (7) that petitioners, thus, agreed to look only to the land-
owners for all sums to become due them under their contracts.
The agreement of the landowners to pay a fixed sum per ton
for mining and delivering the coal "was a personal covenant
and did not purport to grant [petitioners] an interest in the
[coal in place]."98
It is somewhat difficult to assess the dimension added to the
Palmer v. Bender definition of an economic interest by the seven
factors in Parsons v. Smith. The first half of the definition is re-
flected in the first five factors of Parsons v. Smith, the fifth factor
overlapping into both halves of the definition. These factors,
however, are of little use in distinguishing a contract miner from
a lessee. A lessee who has an economic interest often makes no ac-
tual capital investment in the mineral in place;99 thus, he would
have only the same fictional investment as was asserted by the
98 359 U.S. at 225 (emphasis added).
99 See, e.g., United States v. Swank, 101 S. Ct. at 1933-34 (royalty per ton of coal
produced, subject to annual minimum); Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328
U.S. 25 (1946) (royalties due only on production; lessee covenanted to diligently explore
and develop); Winters Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 995 (subject to monthly min-
imum); Omer v. United States, 329 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1964); Bakertown Coal Co. v.
United States, 485 F.2d 633, 634 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (subject to qualified monthly minimum).
Minimum royalties are frequently nominal in relation to the actual royalties paid based on
production. See generally AMERICAN LAW OF MINING. supra note 71, at §§ 16.56-.57.
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contractors in Parsons v. Smith. Frequently the lessee's sole in-
vestment is in depreciable equipment and deductible develop-
ment expenses.'00 In addition, leases are often terminable on
short notice without cause;' 0' yet, despite this similarity, the
Court emphasized the short notice terminability factor as the
most significant in concluding that the contract miners had no
economic interest.
The portion of the fourth factor emphasizing that the lan-
downers did not agree to surrender a capital interest in the coal
in place begs the question. The particular form of the contrac-
tual agreement by which a taxpayer claiming the depletion al-
lowance has acquired his rights is clearly irrelevant.102 Substance,
not form, governs. 0 3 While the parties may structure respective
substantive rights in order to create a capital interest in both or
only one of the parties, 10 they cannot, by simply stating that a
capital interest is or is not granted, effect that result. 10
The Court's reliance on "ownership" of the coal-the fifth
factor-is also difficult to reconcile with previous pronounce-
ments of the Court defining the parameters of the economic in-
terest. In previous cases reliance on the niceties of title had been
loo See, e.g., Bakertown Coal Co. v. United States, 485 F.2d at 634-35; Mullins v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C. 571,579 (1967).
101 See, e.g., United States v. Swank, 101 S. Ct. at 1933; Winters Coal Co. v. Com-
missioner, 496 F.2d at 996; Whitmer v. Commissioner, 443 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1971);
Bakertown Coal Co. v. United States, 485 F.2d at 634; Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.
594 (1979); Mullins v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. at573-76.
102 Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. at 30; Palmer v. Bender, 287
U.S. at 557; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. at 111; Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S.
364. But see Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land Development Co., 303 U.S. 372.
103 This is merely a specific application of the substance over form doctrine. For a
general discussion of that doctrine see Bittker, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the Con-
struction of the Internal Revenue Code, 21 How. L.J. 693, 703-13 (1975).
104 See Bulleit, A Tax Incentive Approach to the Depletion Allowance Dilemma, 82
W. VA. L. REv. 1115, 1130-34, 1137-38 (1980).
105 In Washburn v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 217 (1965), the contract between the
contract miner and owner of the mineral rights specifically provided that the contractor
had no economic interest, but the court apparently did not consider the effect of this provi-
sion, finding the facts so substantially similar to Paragon Jewel Coal Co. as to preclude a
finding for the taxpayer. For a discussion of various substantive provisions in a contract
between the owner of the mineral rights and a miner that will indicate whether an eco-
nomic interest has been conveyed to the miner, see Bulleit, supra note 104, at 1130-34.
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eschewed. 10 This principle is at the heart of the concept of eco-
nomic interest: although legal title strongly indicates the pres-
ence of an economic interest, the absence of ownership, or even a
legal estate, does not equally indicate the absence of an economic
interest. 7
The sixth and seventh factors appeared to signal a strict view
of the second half of the Palmer v. Bender test of an economic in-
terest. Although the Court could have upheld the Service's attack
on the contract miners' deduction on the sole ground that the
short notice terminability of the contract precluded the taxpayers
from meeting the first half of the test, the Court went far beyond
this. It rejected the logic of Eastern Coal Corp. v. Yoke, accepted
by the Service in G.C.M. 26290, and embraced instead the view
of the Tax Court that payment to the contract miner of a fixed
sum per ton of coal rather than a portion of the proceeds from the
sale of the coal deprived the contractor of an economic interest. 108
Thus, the composite effect of the last three factors in Parsons
v. Smith, when considered in terms of the definition of an eco-
nomic interest, focuses on the second half of the definition. This
result is difficult to reconcile with the established rule that a les-
sor who reserves a royalty requiring payment of a fixed sum per
unit of mineral extracted retains an economic interest. 109
Parsons v. Smith clearly added further weight to the control
theory of analyzing the first half of the definition of an economic
interest. The factor of the most importance to the Court was the
terminability of the contract on short notice without cause.1 0 As
a result, the terminability of the contract miner's contract on
10 E.g., Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. at 315; Palmer v.
Bender, 287 U.S. at 557; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. at 111; Lynch v. Alworth-Stevens
Co., 267 U.S. at 370.
107 Sneed, supra note 53, at 336-37. Subsequent to Parsons v. Smith, Professor Sneed
concluded that the Supreme Court had returned to an "ownership" test for an economic
interest. Sneed, Supreme Court Strip Mining Decisions Alter Tests for Depletable Inter-
ests, 11 J. TAX N. 2 (1959). With the decision in Swank, it is clear that this is not so.
1M Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. at 225.
109 See Sneed, supra note 53, at 324. But cf. Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957) (agreement construed as a contract for sale rather
than a mineral lease with an economic interest retained).




short notice without cause became talismanic in some cases fol-
lowing Parsons v. Smith."' Other cases, however, did not focus
solely on the factor of terminability but considered also the
method of compensation.112 The decision of the Supreme Court
in Paragon Jewel Coal Co. indicated that those courts which em-
phasized both the method of compensation as well as terminabil-
ity took the better view.
The issue in Paragon Jewel Coal Co. was essentially the same
as that in Parsons v. Smith. In addition, the facts of the two cases
were similar, except that in Paragon Jewel Coal Co. the con-
tracts were oral and not expressly terminable, and the contract
miners utilized drift mining rather than the strip mining method.
The miners in Paragon Jewel Coal Co. consequently incurred
substantially greater nonproductive expenses in opening the
mines."3 Nevertheless, the Tax Court held that Parsons v. Smith
controlled, finding that the contracts were in fact terminable at
will and that the price paid to the miners was a fixed sum pay-
ment, despite the fact that the price could change from time to
time depending on the general trend of the market. 114 The Fourth
Circuit reversed, concluding that the miners had a right to mine
the coal to exhaustion at a price per ton that was "closely related"
to the market price and, consequently, that the contract miners
had an economic interest.115
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, agreeing
with the Tax Court that the contract miners did not have an eco-
nomic interest in the coal. The Court emphasized the absence of
a direct relationship between the price paid to the miners and the
111 See Elm Development Co. v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1963) (al-
lowing contract miner depletion allowance where contract was not terminable on short
notice); McCall v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 699; United States v. Stallard, 273 F.2d 847
(4th Cir. 1959) (denying contract miners depletion where contract terminable on short no-
tice); Utah Alloy Ores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 917 (1960).
112 See Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959); Merritt v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 257, 282 (1962), rev'd, 330 F.2d 161 (4th Cir.), rev'd sub nom.
Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624 (1964); Leggv. Commissioner, 39
T.C. 20 (1962).
113 380 U.S. at 628-30.
114 Merritt v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. at 281-82.
15 Merritt v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 161, 163 (4th Cir. 1964).
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market price at which Paragon sold the coal." 6 The miners re-
ceived no percentage of the income from the sale of the coal;
rather, they looked solely to Paragon for payment.11 7 Although
the Court considered the terminability factor, concluding that
the contracts were terminable at will, this factor was not dis-
positive. Indeed, the Court stated that even the "right to
mine.., to exhaustion, without more, does not constitute an
economic interest under Parsons, but is a mere economic advan-
tage.. . ."I" The Paragon Jewel Coal Co. decision, then, was
based on the contract miners' failure to meet the test of the sec-
ond half of the Palmer v. Bender definition of an economic inter-
est embodied in the regulations." 9 Thus, a person deriving in-
come from a mining activity does not necessarily have an eco-
nomic interest merely because he has a right to extract the min-
eral; he must also look solely to the extraction and sale at a price
related to market price in some manner.
Although Paragon Jewel Coal Co. left unresolved the issue of
the effect of a short notice termination provision on the first half
of the test for an economic interest, terminability of their agree-
ments on short notice remained one of the key elements cited by
the lower courts in holding that contract miners did not have an
economic interest. 12 Nevertheless, Paragon Jewel Coal Co. was
followed in denying the depletion deduction to contract miners,
even where their contracts were not terminable on short notice,
if the contract called for a fixed sum payment for extraction of
the mineral.' 2' Consequently, the method of compensation has
now become the key factor in distinguishing contract miners
from lessees. But Paragon Jewel Coal Co. clearly did not weaken
116 380 U.S. at 635.
117 Id. at 635, 638.
118 Id. at 634.
119 See text accompanying note 108 supra for a discussion of the Palmer v. Bender
test of an economic interest.
120 E.g., Constantino v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 405; United States v. Wade, 381
F.2d 345; United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Patterson, 203 F. Supp. 335, 365 (N.D.
Ala. 1962); Ramey v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 363 (1967), affd, 398 F.2d 478 (6th Cir.
1965); Washburn v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. at 224.




the theory that control over the deposit is the key to satisfaction
of the first half of the test for an economic interest.
B. The Terminable Lease Cases and The First Half of the
Palmer v. Bender Test
It has been suggested that the genesis of the Internal Revenue
Service position that the lessee under a lease terminable on short
notice had no economic interest in the mineral in place lay in a
misinterpretation by the Service of G.C.M. 26290.12 However,
the dearth of any reported cases in which the Service asserted
that position during the period between the promulgation of
G.C.M. 26290 and the decision in Parsons v. Smith belies that
suggestion. A more likely genesis of the position lies in the thrust
of the opinion in Parsons v. Smith. The strong emphasis in that
case on the terminable nature of the contract miners' rights as a
basis for concluding that they had no economic interest almost
inescapably leads to the conclusion that a lessee under a lease ter-
minable on short notice without cause cannot meet the first half
of the test, for unless there is an enforceable right to extract the
mineral the first part of the test would be meaningless. Prior to
Parsons v. Smith, other decisions of the Court had already clearly
established that neither a cash investment in the mineral deposit
nor legal title to the mineral before or after extraction was neces-
sary to an economic interest. The only strain of consistency,
therefore, was that the holder of an economic interest held an en-
forceable right to benefit from the deposit through the receipt of
income as a result of the extraction of the mineral.
The Tax Court uniformly accepted the Commissioner's view
in terminable lease cases. 121 The logic of the Tax Court position is
best set forth in Mullins v. Commissioner. 1 That case involved
three separate leases of the Blair, Clintwood, and Boiling coal
122 Bakertown Coal Co. v. United States, 485 F.2d at 636-37.
123 Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594; Winters Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 57
T.C. 249 (1971), rev'd, 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974); Whitmer v. Commissioner, 28
T.C.M. (C.C.H.) 1480 (1969), affd, 443 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1971); Mullins v. Commis-
sioner, 48 T.C. 571; Smoot v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 1038 (1932). See also Holbrook v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 415 (1975) (terminable, non-exclusive license to extract minerals).
124 48 T.C. 571 (1967).
[Vol. 70
REDEFINING ECONOMIC INTEREST
seams. The court found that the oral lease of the Blair seam was
not terminable on short notice; the taxpayer had an enforceable
right to mine the seam to exhaustion. The Clintwood lease was
for a term of two years. The Boiling lease, however, was termi-
nable on sixty days' notice. With respect to the Blair and Clint-
wood leases, the court held that the Parsons v. Smith factors indi-
cated that the taxpayer had an economic interest in the mineral
in place.l1, On the other hand, the court found no such economic
interest in the taxpayer under the Boiling lease.
The sole basis of the court's holding in Mullins that the tax-
payer had no economic interest in the coal in place under the
Boiling lease was the termination clause. The court specifically
found that none of the Parsons v. Smith disqualifying factors
were present except the terminability of the lease and the resul-
tant conclusion that the lessor had not surrendered a capital in-
terest.' That the taxpayer could profit only from the sale of the
coal and thus bore all of the benefits and burdens of market fluc-
tuations was not sufficient to establish an economic interest. Be-
cause the terminability of the lease defeated any interest in the
mineral in place, the taxpayer failed to satisfy the first half of the
test. Thus, merely avoiding a majority of the Parsons v. Smith
disqualifying factors was insufficient to avoid a determination
that the taxpayer had no economic interest. Rather, the quality
of the factors present was crucial:
While in both Parsons and Paragon the Supreme Court did
not say which of the seven factors listed by it were absolutely
essential in determining that the contractors had no economic
interest, there is little doubt that in order to have a property
right the contract lessee must have an interest which cannot be
terminated at the will of the lessor or on short no-
tice .... Only V.I.C. [the lessor], which in effect still had
complete control over the coal in place through its right to ter-
minate the Bolling lease without showing cause, possessed the
qualifying depletable interest within the intendment of section
611.127
12 Id. at 579-82.
12 Id. at 582-83.
'7 Id. at 583.
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Despite the court's reference to a "property right," it seems
clearly to have actually applied the control theory to determine
whether the taxpayer had satisfied the first half of the economic
interest test. The lessee failed to have an economic interest not
because he lacked property rights under the lease, but because he
had insufficient control. Although there is no doubt that under
the niceties of property law the lessee did have a "property right"
in at least some of the coal in place, 2 the court did not consider
that right extensive enough to constitute an interest in the min-
eral in place. That the amount of coal which the miner could ex-
tract under the lease was a key element is reinforced by compar-
ing the court's analysis of the two-year Clintwood lease. In that
situation, the court said, the lessee had "sufficient time. . . to
extract a substantial portion of the coal from that seam."'9
The theme of the extent of the lessee's right to extraction re-
appeared in the Tax Court's opinion in Weaver v. Commis-
sioner. 1 0 In that case the court denied depletion to a lessee of
sand and gravel deposits under a lease terminable at will by the
lessor, but the lessee was allowed depletion under a lease termi-
nable on 120 days' notice. The court said:
Clearly a line must be drawn somewhere between a cancella-
tion clause with a notice so short that the lessee's market rights
to mineral in place are for all practical purposes illusory, and a
clause which leaves the lessee with substantive rights of gen-
uine economic significance. The question is very close, and our
record is not helpful in disclosing the economic potential of a
guaranteed 120-day mining period. Nevertheless, like other
close questions it must be decided, and we are of the view that
a 120-day period of notice under the circumstances here was
longer than nominal and had sufficient economic significance
128 See Bakertown Coal Co. v. United States, 485 F.2d at 636. See generally AiMIER-
icAN LAw OF MINING, supra note 71, at §§ 16.10-.14.
129 48 T.C. at 580. The court referred to G.C.M. 26290, 1950-1 C.B. 42, 45, in this
regard, thereby supporting the inference that the court was looking to the right to exhaust
the deposit test sometimes asserted by the Service and applied in earlier cases. The right to
exhaust the deposit without more was, however, deemed irrelevant two years earlier in
Paragon Jewel Coal Co. See text accompanying note 116 supra for a discussion of the judi-
cial history of Paragon Jewel Coal Co.
130 72 T.C. 594 (1979).
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to give the petitioner a capital interest in the minerals in place,
albeit a rather nominal one. 131
There is no hint that niceties of property rights were considered.
Rather, the key was the existence of "substantive rights of gen-
uine economic significance."
The Tax Court view reflected an ex ante analysis of the for-
mal substantive rights of the parties: the existence of an economic
interest was determined by reference to the minimum rights to
which the lessee may be entitled, rather than those he may have
subsequently exercised. Chief Judge Drennen dissented in
Mullins, applying an ex post test of substantive rights in contrast
to the majority's ex ante approach. 32 His dissent was a curious
blend of policy and formal property law, which looked simply to
whether the taxpayer had in fact extracted and sold the coal to
determine entitlement to the depletion allowance. Since the
lessee, according to the dissent, was the only person who could
have any "gross income from mining," he should be entitled to
depletion.1 33 This approach, of course, emphasizes the second
half of the test for an economic interest, treating the first half of
the test almost as an unwarranted formalism required by courts.
Consistently, the dissent approached the first half of the test in
formalistic terms, treating the terminability provision as a mere
possibility of divestment of an interest that has no effect unless
exercised. 34
Judge Drennan's analysis was adopted by the Court of
Claims in Bakertown Coal Co. v. United States,13 which held
that a lessee under a lease terminable on thirty days' notice had
an economic interest in the mineral in place.' The Court of
Claims, as had Judge Drennan in his dissent in Mullins, failed to
analyze the lessee's rights under the Palmer v. Bender definition
131 Id. at 608-09.
132 48 T.C. at 583-85 (Drennan, C.J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 584. The dissent is technically incorrect in stating that the lessee was the
only person who could have had any gross income from mining. Lessors of mineral prop-
erty are allowed depletion (or capital gains if § 636 applies) on their royalties, and deple-
tion is allowable only with respect to gross income from mining. I.R.C. § 613(a) (1976).
1'34 48 T.C. at 585.
'3 485 F.2d 633 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
136 Id. at 641.
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of an economic interest. Instead, the court recited the Parsons v.
Smith factors and concluded that Paragon Jewel Coal Co.
limited the application of the terminability factor to contract
miners. 3 7 The court refused to follow the Tax Court decisions,
concluding that the Tax Court had erroneously applied the con-
tract miner cases. 13 Later, the Court of Claims reached the same
result in Swank, relying on its opinion in Bakertown Coal Co.
Although the ex post analysis reflects sound property law,"3
technical property rights cannot be unqualifiedly asserted as con-
trolling principles under the Palmer v. Bender definition of an
economic interest. Such an analysis does not vitiate the logic of
Mullins refusing to find an economic interest in the coal in place
where the lessee lacks control over the deposit; in such cases, the
taxpayer has no right to mine any substantial amount of coal. To
look retrospectively, as the Mullins dissent and the Court of
Claims did, to find that the first half of the test is met because the
lease was not in fact terminated, thus enabling the lessee to mine
the coal under the lease for a substantial period, is to confuse the
day-to-day right to extract the mineral with an ongoing right in
the unextracted mineral. In this confusion, satisfaction of the
second half of the test for an economic interest is transmuted into
satisfaction of the first half. 140
Only two courts of appeals have been confronted with the
issue of whether a lessee under a lease terminable on short notice
has an economic interest in the mineral in place. The opinion of
the Fifth Circuit reversing the Tax Court in Winters Coal Co. v.
Commissioner14 1 did little to clarify the then-existing confusion.
One judge concluded that the lessor's right to terminate the lease
on thirty days' notice was clearly not sufficient to defeat the les-
see's claim to an economic interest. In addition to following the
Bakertown Coal Co. reasoning that the nature of a lessee's inter-
est under property law is not altered by the existence of an unex-
137 id. at 638-39.
138 Id. at 639-41. This view also finds support in P. BuaKE & R. BowHAY, INCOME
TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES 210-11 n. 32 (1979).
139 485 F.2d at 636.
140 See text accompanying notes 67-80 supra for a discussion of the two-pronged con-
junctive test.
141 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g 57 T.C. 249 (1971).
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ercised power of termination, the judge appears to have applied
the Parsons v. Smith criteria without regard to either qualitative
differences or to which half of the test each factor was directed. 142
On the other hand, two judges were unwilling to uncategorically
hold that a lessee under a terminable lease automatically had an
interest in the mineral in place. Instead, they relied upon the fact
that the lessee in Winters had purchased the surface rights neces-
sary to strip mine the coal, applying Southwest Exploration Co.
by analogy.14 Once the lessee obtained the surface rights, he be-
came an indispensible party to the removal of the coal, as had the
upland owners in Southwest Exploration Co., even though his
right to extract the coal was terminable on thirty days' notice.
The court totally ignored the logic that whatever interest was ob-
tained by purchase of the surface rights, which could possibly
justify depletion with respect to so much of the taxpayer's income
attributable to the fair market value of periodic royalty pay-
ments in consideration of surface rights, 14 should not necessarily
extend the taxpayer's economic interest to that portion of the tax-
payer's income attributable to his active extraction and sale of
the coal. Such income was not analogous to the income received
by the upland owners in Southwest Exploration Co.
The other court of appeals decision was the Third Circuit's
decision in Whitmer v. Commissioner.14 Holding that a lessee
under a lease terminable on thirty days' notice did not have an
economic interest in the mineral in place because he failed the
first half of the test, the court quoted United States v. Stallard,146
stating:
Perhaps the most important [circumstances in determining
whether a mineral producer possesses the requisite economic
interest] is whether the producer has the right under the con-
tract to exhaust the deposit to completion or is subject in this
respect to the will of the owner through a provision in the
142 Id. at 998-99.
143 Id. at 1000-01.
144 See Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308; Manchester Coal
Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 577 (1931). Cf. Beaver Dam Coal Co. v. United States,
370 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1966) (equitable apportionment of actual cost).
145 443 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1971), afg 28 T.C.M. (C.C.H.) 1480.
146 273 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1959).
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agreement empowering the owner to terminate the contract at
will .... 147
This test-if it was indeed actually intended to be advanced as a
test-only adds to the confusion. It has never been a general req-
uisite of an economic interest that it be co-extensive with the life
of a deposit; for example, production payments measurable in a
fixed sum of dollars constitute an economic interest notwith-
standing the absence of co-extensivity, 48 except as otherwise pro-
vided in section 636. 141 Indeed, there is no reason that an operat-
ing interest must be of sufficient duration to exhaust the deposit.
Even prior to Swank, it was sufficient if the operator had a right
to extract "a substantial portion of the deposit.1i ° Moreover, the
mutually exclusive alternative of the Third Circuit is not broad
enough to govern all possible lease arrangements. Such a test
leaves unanswered the appropriate treatment of the lessee under
a ten-year lease to extract mineral from a deposit which the par-
ties do not expect to be exhausted for twenty years. The Service
clearly would not have challenged the lessee's claim of an eco-
nomic interest under such a lease. 151
Such was the confused state of the law regarding leases ter-
minable on short notice prior to Swank. The Service and the Tax
Court analyzed the substantive interests of the lessee and con-
cluded that the first half of the test, requiring a capital interest in
the mineral in place, could not be met if the lessee's rights could
be terminated without cause on short notice. Despite loose lan-
guage in many cases to the contrary, a cash capital investment
was not a prerequisite to holding a capital interest in the mineral
in place. 2 The Parsons v. Smith factors were analyzed qualita-
147 443 F.2d at 173 (quoting 273 F.2d at 851).
148 Thomas v. Perkins, 201 U.S. 655 (1937). See generally Hambrick, supra note 78,
at 38-44.
149 See note 165 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the treatment of pro-
duction payments under I.R.C. § 636.
150 G.C.M. 26290, 1950-1 C.B. 42, declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 70-277,1970-1 C.B.
280.
151 See id.
152 Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 605. Even the Tax Court seemed to believe
that the taxpayer must have made some out-of-pocket expenditure associated with extract-
ing the natural resource. But see Winters Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 995 (dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 141-44 supra.)
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tively rather than quantitatively, and terminability was a key.
The Service and the Tax Court may have differed, however, on
the requisite minimum term of the lease. The Service generally
considered that a term of at least one year was necessary. The
Tax Court, on the other hand, found 120 days sufficient in
Weaver, although since it deals with sand and gravel that case
may not have the same relevance to a case involving coal min-
ing. 53
The key to the Tax Court's theory that the lessee under a ter-
minable lease had no capital interest in the mineral in place was
that the lessor retained control of the mineral deposit through the
power to terminate the lease; therefore, the rights of the lessee to
the mineral in place were illusory and existed only with respect to
extracted minerals. Although the Tax Court's theory comports
nicely with the control theme of the landmark Supreme Court
decisions, the divergent results in the case of a lease terminable
on sixty days' notice in Mullins and one terminable on 120 days'
notice in Weaver illustrate the difficulty in applying its theory.
Although arbitrary rules are sometimes a necessity, so that diver-
gent results are justifiable where the taxpayers' conduct falls on
opposite sides of an imaginary dividing line, the different treat-
ment resulting from the Tax Court theory seems difficult to justi-
fy. A simple example illustrates the problem: Lessee A enters into
a five-year coal lease on January 1, 1980, subject to termination
by the lessor at any time on sixty days' notice. Neither party at
the time of execution contemplates that the lease will in fact be
terminated and it is not so terminated. At the time of execution
of the lease both the lessor and lessee contemplate that five years
is insufficient to exhaust the deposit, and after five years the de-
posit has not in fact been substantially exhausted. Lessee B enters
153 The Weaver court stated:
[W]e are of the view that a 120-day period of notice under the circumstances
here was longer than nominal and had sufficient economic significance to
give the petitioner a capital interest in the mineral in place .... Each case
must of course turn on its own facts. If in a given case it were shown that 120
days would be required simply to close down operations and that there
would be insignificant production after notice were given, that would no
doubt be a different matter.
72 T.C. at 608-09.
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into a lease on the same terms as Lessee A except that the lease is
terminable upon 120 days' prior notice. All of the other facts are
the same. Under the Tax Court theory Lessee A had no economic
interest and was not entitled to depletion, but Lessee B may have
had an economic interest and thus may have been entitled to de-
pletion. Such an arbitrary line is not justifiable.
While the result reached by the Tax Court seems to be un-
reasonable on policy grounds,'-" despite its sound logic when
viewed from the control theory of a capital interest in minerals,
the result reached by the Court of Claims cannot be squared with
any notion of a capital interest in the mineral in place seemingly
required by Supreme Court decisions prior to Swank. The Court
of Claims' logic, while avoiding the arbitrary "cliff" effect of the
Tax Court rule, was based solely on the factor that the lessee gen-
erated income from mining and selling coal on the open mar-
ket.15 Thus, if the lessee did not get the depletion allowance, no
one would.1 It simply seemed reasonable that someone should
get the depletion allowance, and the lessee was the only person
conceivably entitled to it. This, however, is a major policy argu-
ment which finds little basis for support in the definition and
tests of an economic interest and is contrary to the Supreme
Court's oft-repeated maxim that "[t]he deduction is ... per-
mitted as an act of grace. . ...15
C. The Impact of Policy Considerations on the Early Cases
How then do the putative and seemingly actual tests for the
presence of an economic interest square with the policy underly-
ing the depletion allowance? If the purpose of depletion is not
merely to provide for a return of invested capital, but also to
stimulate and encourage the exploration and development of
new mineral deposits, what criteria should determine eligibility
154 See Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. at 559. In Palmer v. Bender, the Court indicated
that it would be anomalous to deny depletion completely and thereby defeat the purpose
of the depletion allowance merely because of the form of the transaction.
I-' Swank v. United States, 602 F.2d at 353-54; Bakertown Coal Co. v. United
States, 485 F.2d at 641.
10 602 F.2d at 351; 485 F.2d at 642.
157 See, e.g., Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. at 408.
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for depletion? In other words, what factors should evidence the
existence of the elusively defined but seemingly recognizable
"economic interest"? Suggested standards include that the source
of income is from the extraction of mineral,, '8that the taxpayer
has made an investment of capital in the mineral in place, 159 that
the taxpayer has legal or equitable title in the mineral in place, 63
or that the taxpayer has, or previously had, control over the min-
eral in place as owner, lessor, lessee, or a party having similar
rights.16'
It should be apparent that an actual capital investment in the
mineral in place should entitle the investor to depletion realized
upon the extraction of the mineral. 12 The decisions are largely
consistent with this theory. An actual prior investment alone,
however, will not entitle the investor to depletion where the in-
come is not from extraction and sale of the mineral but from the
outright sale of the mineral property.6 3 Similarly, a taxpayer
having legal or equitable title to a mineral deposit should be en-
titled to depletion. He owns and controls a valuable resource, his
consent to its extraction is necessary, and he will have acquired
his title by virtue of investment in the deposit.
A mere right to income derived from the extraction of min-
erals, however, should not necessaiily constitute an economic in-
terest. Although permitting depletion against income derived as
a result of the taxpayer's investment risk or contribution of effort
in the exploration, development, and extraction of the mineral is
consistent with the policy goals to be furthered,5 8 a somewhat
158 Casey, supra note 60, at 137-39.
159 Bulleit, supra note 104, at 1134-36. It does not appear, however, that the author
intended that the absence of an actual capital investment would preclude a taxpayer from
having an economic interest. Thus an actual capital investment might be better described
as evidence of an economic interest rather than as a prerequisite.
160 Sneed, supra note 53, at 335. A similar test based on ownership of a real property
interest in the mineral, as defined under state law, has also been suggested. Bulleit, supra
note 104, at 1134-35.
161 Hambrick, supra note 78, at 21.
162 See Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594.
163 Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land Dev. Corp., 303 U.S. 372 (1938). See I.R.C. § 638(b)
(1976). See generally Hambrick, supra note 78, at 38-44.
'64 See Rev. Rul. 54-84, 1954-1 C.B. 284; Hambrick, supra note 78, at 22-25. Profes-
sor Hambrick argues that contributions to the operation and processing after the develop-
ment stage should not give rise to an economic interest because the same risks are not in-
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more difficult issue is presented when the taxpayer has not made
such a contribution but has acquired a right to income from the
extraction of the mineral in exchange for some other consider-
ation. An illustration of this problem is the carved-out produc-
tion payment, which is now specifically covered by section
636.16 Treating the purchaser of a carved-out production pay-
ment-the purchase proceeds of which are pledged to explor-
ation or development of the same mineral property-as holding
an economic interest furthers the same policy goals as percentage
depletion. Although there is no depletion benefit in allowing the
transfer of an economic interest to the holder of the carved-out
production payment, the transferor is allowed to amortize what
is in effect a loan out of before-tax dollars. 166 If, however, the
"loan" proceeds are not certainly to be devoted to exploration
and development of new mineral resources, an unwarranted
benefit would be granted if the "borrower" is permitted to amor-
tize the loan principal out of before-tax dollars merely because he
has earmarked income derived from the extraction of a mineral
as a source of repayment. This is a greater advantage than is
volved. Although this position is clearly correct with respect to processing, see text accom-
panying notes 76-77 supra, the conclusion that operating risks are not to be rewarded by
percentage depletion is not so clear. A lessee may in fact incur only operating risks, de-
pending on the industry practices with respect to exploration and disdovery. Nevertheless,
a lessee-operator is clearly allowed depletion. Furthermore, the policy orientation of
Swank clearly heralds that an operator's risk be rewarded. See United States v. Swank,
101 S. Ct. at 1939.
165 I.R.C. § 636(a) (1976) provides:
A production payment carved out of mineral property shall be treated,
for purposes of this subtitle, as if it were a mortgage loan on the property,
and shall not qualify as an economic interest in the mineral property. In the
case of a production payment carved out for exploration or development of a
mineral property, the preceding sentence shall apply only if and to the ex-
tent gross income from the property (for purposes of section 613) would be
realized, in the absence of the application of such sentence, by the person
creating the production payment.
Similar treatment as a mortgage loan is accorded retained production payments on the
sale of mineral property by I.R.C. § 636(b) (1976), but under § 636(c) a retained produc-
tion payment on a lease is treated as a bonus. See notes 227-29 infra and accompanying
text for a discussion of the treatment of bonuses as depletable income.
166 H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200,




necessary to encourage exploration and development of natural
resources.
Situations also arise where the transaction is not analogous to
a loan because the value of the assigned interest is not delimited
by a dollar amount. In Helvering v. O'Donnell'6 the taxpayer re-
ceived a net profits interest in certain oil leases in consideration of
the transfer of stock of the corporation holding the leases. Be-
cause the transferor corporation, not the shareholder-taxpayer,
owned the leases and the agreement did not grant the taxpayer a
legal or equitable interest in the mineral properties themselves,
the Supreme Court held that the taxpayer did not have an eco-
nomic interest in the oil in place. The purchasing corporation
merely promised to pay the taxpayer a portion of its profits. Al-
though the argument was not discussed by the Court, it seems
clear that the taxpayer could not claim that his net profits inter-
est was received in consideration of his contribution to the ex-
ploration and development of the oil leases.
Consideration other than a contribution to exploration and
development may, however, give rise to an economic interest if
the income is derived from a legal or equitable interest in the
mineral in place assigned to the taxpayer in consideration of such
services. If a taxpayer is assigned an undivided share of the work-
ing interest in a mineral property, consideration in kind or in ser-
vices should not be treated any differently than cash consider-
ation. 6 If, however, the taxpayer acquires merely a royalty or
net profits interest for consideration other than a contribution to
the exploration and development, such as legal services to the op-
erator or a royalty holder, the taxpayer should not have an eco-
nomic interest. 1R Rather, he should have ordinary income equal
to the value of the rights assigned, with no depletion allowed.
The assignor of the income interest, analogous to the seller of
a carved-out production payment, should not be permitted to
pay for the nonessential services with before-tax dollars, the re-
167 303 U.S. 370 (1938).
168 The person contributing such nonessential services would, of course, recognize
ordinary income equal to the fair market value of the interest assigned to him. I.R.C. § 83
(1976).
169 But see Sneed, supra note 53, at 354.
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sult which would follow if the assignee were held to have an eco-
nomic interest.
A similar analysis can be applied to Bankline Oil Co., where
the question was not which taxpayer was entitled to depletion,
but whether any taxpayer could claim the allowance. Even if the
taxpayer was denied depletion on the profits attributable to his
bargain purchase of the mineral from the producer, the producer
could nevertheless claim depletion only on the sales price to the
taxpayer. Although it is reasonably clear that the taxpayer in
Bankline Oil Co. derived income as a result of the extraction and
sale of gas, 170 the decision that the taxpayer did not have an eco-
nomic interest was correct. The taxpayer in Bankline Oil Co.
made no greater contribution to the exploration and develop-
ment of resources than does any other purchaser of a mineral re-
source who assures his supply through a long-term contract
which simultaneously assures the seller of a market. If an electric
utility company enters into a long-term contract with the owner-
operator of a coal mine to supply coal to the utility at a fixed
price, one could hardly say that the utility company has an inter-
est that should give rise to depletion if the market value of coal
rises above the contract price, but not if the market value is at or
below the contract price.171 The utility's contribution to the de-
velopment and exploration of the mineral resource is too remote.
Finally, one must ask how the control test for determining an
interest in the mineral in place comports with the policy behind
percentage depletion. It is self-evident that depletion should be
available to an operator in control of the mineral property as a
lessee or owner. But is it equally obvious that depletion should be
available to the owner-lessor or sublessor'72 who does not present-
170 See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra for a discussion of the source-of-income
analysis as applied to the Banidine Oil Co. taxpayer.
171 See Douglas Coal Co. v. United States, 429 F. Supp. at 338-39; Thornberry
Constr. Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d 346; Filtrol Corp. v. United States, 487 F.2d 536
(Ct. Cl. 1973) (per curiam).
172 In the case of coal or iron ore, a lessor with a retained economic interest receives
capital gain treatment with respect to the amount of royalties in excess of his cost basis in-
stead of depletion. I.R.C. § 631(c) (Supp. III 1979). The issue is the same, however, since
the purpose of § 631(c) was to provide lessors of coal and iron properties an even greater
incentive than that provided by percentage depletion on royalties. See S. REP. No. 781,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), reprinted in 1951-1 C.B. 458, 488.
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ly control the extraction of the mineral if he has not made an ac-
tual cash investment?173 It is quite possible that the taxpayer has
made no active contribution to the exploration and development
of the mineral property. He has, however, made his property
available for exploration and development to another person
who is willing to undertake the risks. Without the lessor's surren-
der of control, removal of the mineral deposit is impossible.
Therefore, income received in consideration of surrender of con-
trol should be treated identically with income received as a result
of exercise of control. Furthermore, the lessor presumably has
surrendered control over the deposit at a cost to the person un-
dertaking exploration and development less than that which he
would have demanded absent the availability of depletion.to him
as a lessor. This in turn may stimulate exploration and develop-
ment by lessees of tracts which may not otherwise have been eco-
nomically feasible to develop. Therefore, allowing depletion
against royalty income seems to serve the policy goals of the de-
pletion allowance.
It is anomalous, but not surprising given the general develop-
ment of the economic interest theory in cases involving nonoper-
ating interests, that some of the major problems in applying the
definition of economic interest have arisen with respect to
operating interests in certain hard mineral industries, particular-
ly coal. The greatest difficulty in devising a test for an economic
interest compatible with the policy behind percentage depletion
arises with respect to contract miners in the coal industry, who
neither make an actual investment in the acquisition of a tradi-
tional property right in the mineral in place nor acquire control
over the mineral deposit. Contract miners, however, may invest
large sums of money in equipment, which is often the most sig-
nificant capital investment made in connection with the explor-
ation, development, and extraction of the mineral. Further, the
contract miner is integrally involved in the extraction of the min-
173 Mineral leases often require only a nominal cash payment at execution; royalties
are due only when there is production as long as exploration and development are dil-
igently pursued. See, e.g., Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 1187 (1944),
affd, 150 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd and remanded, 328 U.S. 25 (1946), rev'd, 168
F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1946).
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eral. His function is absolutely necessary, although as an individ-
ual he is theoretically fungible with all other persons having the
same capital equipment and skills; no particular miner is indis-
pensible. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held in Parsons v.
Smith and Paragon Jewel Coal Co. that contract miners do not
have an economic interest: they have no interest in the mineral in
place nor is their income derived from extraction and sale of the
mineral. 174
The tax treatment of a contract miner stands in marked con-
trast to, for example, a sublessor holding an overriding royalty
interest. A sublessor serves no necessary function in the sense that
the owner could have extracted the mineral or hired someone else
to do so, but, once having acquired the right to control the min-
eral deposit, the sublessor's cooperation and participation as an
individual are required. A party in this position, therefore, al-
ways has an economic interest and is entitled to depletion, or
capital gains in the case of coal and iron ore, 75 on his entire in-
come.
Similarly, the lessee-operator, who combines the necessary
function of the miner and the necessary person of the lessor, is
permitted depletion with respect to his entire income from the
property. However, it is not necessary that he actually extract the
mineral. The lessee-operator may hire a contract miner. If he
does, he is permitted the depletion allowance even with respect
to the amount he pays the contract miner. If he extracts the min-
eral himself, however, a portion of his income is similar to that of
the contract miner. Nevertheless, the economic interest akin to
that of a lessor extends to allow depletion against his income de-
rived from the same source as that of a contract miner. The dif-
ferent treatment of contract miners and lessee-operators can be
justified only if percentage depletion is intended to encourage
only discovery of mineral resources, rather than extraction. Such
a postulate elevates the control theory to absolute primacy, key-
ing depletion to the taxpayer making land he controls available
for exploration. However, this is clearly not true. Rather, per-
174 See text accompanying notes 85-121 supra for a detailed analysis these cases.
175 See note 172 supra regarding capital gains treatment for coal and iron ore lessors
under I.R.C. § 631 (c).
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centage depletion is available only with reference to extraction of
the mineral. Because depletion is intended to encourage partic-
ipation in the extraction of natural resources, the elevation of the
control theory to absolute primacy is not warranted.
A similar theoretical problem arises with respect to the lessee
under a lease terminable without cause on short notice. With the
exception of the short notice terminability, the lessee under such
a lease is like any other lessee-operator and would thus be en-
titled to depletion with respect to his income from the property.
For twenty years prior to Swank, however, the Service asserted
that the short-term terminability of the lease precluded the lessee
from holding an economic interest. Certainly, the terminability
of a lease on short notice is substantially inconsistent with the
control theory of determining an economic interest in the min-
eral in place. If the lease may be cancelled by the lessor on short
notice and without cause, the lessee can hardly be said to control
the deposit. He has limited control over the amount of the min-
eral which can be removed within the notice period. Thus, the
lessor remains in control of the deposit. If one looks to the control
concept in the general attribution of income rules, this retained
control concept is readily apparent. An apt analogy is a trust for
the benefit of another, revocable by the grantor on thirty days'
prior notice; all the income of the trust is taxable to the gran-
tor. 7 In the terminable lease cases, the unifying thread where a
taxpayer was held to have an economic interest-the control doc-
trine-produces a result inconsistent with the purpose of the de-
pletion allowance. There can be little doubt that a lessee actually
operating a mine, regardless of the term of the lease, is precisely
the type of person who should benefit from the depletion allow-
ance if it is to fulfill its purpose.
III. THE DEFINITION OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AFTER SWANK
From a policy perspective, the Supreme Court reached a de-
sirable result in Swank. To reach this result, however, the Court
went beyond simply applying the traditional definition of an eco-
nomic interest. The decision does not merely resolve the conflict
among courts regarding the effect of a termination clause in the
176 I.R.C. § 676 (1976).
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lease by minimizing the importance of the terminability factor in
the Parsons v. Smith criteria of an economic interest. Rather, it
essentially rewrites the definition of an economic interest first set
forth in Palmer v. Bender and long incorporated into the regula-
tions. The logic of the Court's decision in Swank, if applied with-
out restriction, goes even further than dispensing with the need
for an actual investment in the mineral and totally dispenses with
the need for any capital interest in the mineral in place.
Except by resorting to legal fictions to find a capital interest
in the mineral in place for the purpose of reaching a result con-
sonant with the policy underlying percentage depletion, the tax-
payers in Swank could not have had an economic interest in the
mineral in place as the theory was previously understood. There
was no substance to their claim of a capital interest in the min-
eral because the taxpayers lacked legal or actual control over the
deposits in place. The Court, however, found the argument that
the only significant economic interest was controlled by the lessor
to be unpersuasive for three reasons. First, the Court reasoned
that the lessor would not necessarily terminate the lease and de-
mand a higher royalty if the price of coal rose; that the lease was
not in fact terminated or renegotiated in the face of rising coal
prices belied such an argument. Second, it would be unfair to
deny the taxpayer depletion merely because he had incurred a
business risk in connection with the extraction of the coal not in-
curred by a lessee under a long-term lease. Finally, the Court
concluded:
Third, and most important, the Government has not sug-
gested any rational basis for linking the right to a depletion de-
duction to the period of time that the taxpayer operates a
mine. If the authorization of a special tax benefit for mining a
seam of coal to exhaustion is sound policy, that policy would
seem equally sound whether the entire operation is conducted
by one taxpayer over a prolonged period or by a series of tax-
payers operating for successive shorter periods. The Govern-
ment has suggested no reason why the efficient removal of a
great quantity of coal in less than 30 days should have different
tax consequences than the slower removal of the same quantity
over the prolonged period. 1 77
171 United States v. Swank, 101 S. Ct. at 1939.
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The first two bases of the Court's rationale appear to be contra-
dictory. If the lessor did not retain effective control, the lessee
did not incur a risk of termination. If the lessee incurred a risk of
termination, the lessor had not in fact surrendered control. 7 '
The third basis for the Court's holding, however, totally re-
jects the control theory of determining a capital interest in the
mineral in place. The emphasis is instead on granting "a special
tax benefit for mining a seam of coal." The Court did not merely
reject the Service's proposed minimum duration of a lease; it re-
jected the notion that any minimum duration be required. Thus
a lessee under a lease at will should be permitted the depletion al-
lowance. 179 Surely, however, no one can reasonably say, except
by resorting to the grossest of legal fictions, that the lessee under
a lease terminable at the will of the lessor has any substantial ef-
fective control over or present interest in the unextracted min-
eral.
Silently, but at the core of the Court's decision in Swank,
were the facts that the lessees were participating in the extraction
and sale of the coal in an entrepreneurial capacity and that they
had acquired control over the mineral once extracted-lse The pol-
178 Furthermore, the fact that the lessor did not terminate the lease in the face of ris-
ing coal prices does not indicate a lack of control. It merely indicates that the lessor made a
business judgment that the risks of seeking a higher royalty were not warranted based on
the change in price that had occurred. Surely there is a price level at which the lessor
would have terminated the lease and demanded a higher royalty. See id. at 1944 (White,
J., dissenting). The Court's rationale results in the lessors having retained no control if the
price of the coal does not increase significantly, but having control if the price of coal does
increase significantly. This is a difficult argument to accept.179 But see id. at 1944 (White, J., dissenting). Under the Court's logic there would
also be no reason to deny depletion to a person who extracted coal under a terminable non-
exclusive license, as in Holbrook v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 415.
'8o See 101 S. Ct. at 1944 (White, J., dissenting). In Douglas Coal Co. v. United
States, 429 F. Supp. 322, the court used a similar analysis in applying the Parsons v. Smith
criteria to determine whether an operator who leased coal property from an electric com-
pany and simultaneously contracted to sell the output to the electric company, under
agreements having a five-year term, was a lessee or a contract miner. In holding that the
operator was a lessee entitled to the depletion allowance, the court stated:
The Court has some general, conclusory comments about the Parsons
criteria. It appears to this Court that the thread which ties the several Par-
sons criteria together is the basic question whether the coal operator as-
sumed entrepreneurial-type obligations and risks with respect to the coal it-
self. That question can be answered in the affirmative. Douglas assumed all
obligations with respect to the coal and its production.
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icy goal of percentage depletion-to encourage the exploration,
development, and extraction of natural resources-supported
treatment of the lessees as holders of an economic interest. At the
very least the lessees, even if lacking an interest in the mineral in
place, acquired an interest upon extraction.' 8 Such an interpre-
tation would be the narrowest possible reading of the relaxation
of the test effected by Swank. This shift to a policy basis for de-
termining an economic interest, however, calls for a broader test
incorporating participation in the extraction or initial sale of the
mineral in an entrepreneurial capacity as an alternative to re-
quiring a capital interest in the mineral in place. Whether a tax-
payer would satisfy this requirement would depend upon the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. 112
The primary test for a depletable economic interest after
Swank should be reliance by the taxpayer on extraction and sale
of the mineral for the production of profit. This is essentially the
second half of the Palmer v. Bender test, modified to reflect that
a prior investment or capital interest to be recovered is not neces-
sary. It is similar to the Kirby Petroleum Co. logic. However,
Swank should not be read as simply reducing the definition of an
economic interest to this single element or as merely rewriting
the Palmer v. Bender test as a disjunctive rather than a conjunc-
tive test. For a taxpayer to have an economic interest, his profit
from the extraction and sale of a mineral should result from his
role in the extraction and sale of the mineral.183 Thus, the defini-
tion of an economic interest remains a two-part test.
Id. at 338. There is no indication as to how this entrepreneurial analysis would have been
affected had the lease and sales contract been terminable on short notice.
181 See 101 S. Ct. at 1944 (White, J., dissenting) ("In essence, the Court argues that
because respondents own the coal and sell it on the open market, they must have an inter-
est in the mineral in place."); Swank v. United States, 602 F.2d at 353-54 ("The lessees
right under his lease to convert the lessor's legal title to minerals in place to his own posses-
sion by their severance constitutes a very real economic interest in the mineral in place
which depletes as the minerals are extracted.").
182 See Douglas Coal Co. v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 322.
183 If the test were either solely that the taxpayer relied on extraction and sale of the
mineral for a profit or the Palmer v. Bender test rewritten in the disjunctive, the taxpayer
in cases such as O'Donnell and Banidine Oil Co. would be found to have an economic in-
terest. That result is not warranted by the policy orientation of Swank, which is directed
solely to operating interests. See text accompanying notes 215-19 infra for further discus-
sion of this issue.
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The crucial question following Swank is the delineation of
the second part of that test. The nature of the taxpayer's requisite
relationship to the extraction of the mineral should be defined
with reference to the policy behind percentage depletion. Al-
though the Swank court acknowledged that percentage depletion
is more than a mere device for the recovery of the cost of the min-
eral, it did not explain in detail what it perceived the policy con-
siderations to be. Even absent specific guidance, it is probably
safe to assume that as a general proposition depletion should be
permitted, except as denied by statute, to any person connected
with the extraction of minerals in an entrepreneurial capacity
where the tax benefit will tend to encourage the exploration, de-
velopment, or extraction of minerals. The thrust of the rationale
for allowing depletion to the taxpayer in Swank was that he
should be rewarded for incurring risks in the extraction and sale
of coal. 114This rationale comports with the entrepreneurial en-
titlement view of the depletion allowance. At the same time it
must be recognized that entrepreneurial activity cannot be so ele-
vated as to sacrifice the control theory when applied to nonoper-
ating interests, which might be tested generally under the tradi-
tional test of Palmer v. Bender. This analysis suggests that the
definition of an economic interest should continue to be a two-
part test, but that it must now be modified. The first half of the
new test for an economic interest should be whether the tax-
payer's income is solely from the extraction and sale of the min-
eral. If that test is met, then either of two alternative tests must
be met. Under the first alternative, the right to the income must
be derived from a capital interest in the mineral in place-the
traditional first half of the Palmer v. Bender test. Control of the
mineral deposit remains the key theoretical element under this
alternative. Under the second alternative, the right to the income
must be derived from entrepreneurial activity in connection with
the extraction and sale of the mineral. This alternative was the
one met by the taxpayers in Swank. An examination of the appli-
cation of this revised definition is appropriate to illustrate its ef-
fect upon the results of the earlier cases.
1'4 101 S. Ct. at 1939. See id. at 1944 (White, J., dissenting).
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A. The Contract Miner Cases Revisited
Although many of the contract miner cases decided by the
lower courts emphasized terminability as a basis for finding that
the contract miner had no economic interest,"" the Swank hold-
ing that terminability of a lease on short notice does not preclude
an economic interest in the lessee was not intended by the Court
to reverse Parsons v. Smith and Paragon Jewel Coal Co. The
Swank opinion specifically states that the Court did not consider
the terminability of the contract miners' rights in those cases to
be the key factor. 186 Rather, the Court viewed the key factor in
both Parsons v. Smith and Paragon Jewel Coal Co. to be that the
contract miners received a fixed price for the coal they mined:
they did not share the benefits and burdens of market fluctu-
ations in the price of coal.
Although Justice White's dissent in Swank describes the ma-
jority's characterization of Parsons v. Smith and Paragon Jewel
Coal Co. as an attempt to "rewrite those cases in light of what it
determines to be the more important factor,'187 this criticism is
not entirely correct.88 Paragon Jewel Coal Co. clearly held that a
contract miner did not have an economic interest even if his
rights were not terminable, 189 and lower court decisions frequent-
ly acknowledged that the basis for compensation was a key factor
in denying a contract miner an economic interest. " Despite any
"rewriting" of Parsons v. Smith and Paragon Jewel Coal Co. that
185 See cases cited in notes 111 and 112 supra for cases dealing with this issue.
186 101 S. Ct. at 1938.
117 Id. at 1944 (White, J., dissenting).
188 The dissent was correct, however, that Paragon Jewel Coal Co. did nothing to
vitiate the very strong inference of Parsons v. Smith that terminability of rights was per se
fatal to any claim of an economic interest. See text accompanying note 118 supra for a dis-
cussion of the interrelationship of the rationale in Parsons and the decision in Paragon
Jewel Coal Co.
189 Paragon Jewel Coal Co. made it clear that, at least in that case, the contract
miners did not have an economic interest because they failed the second half of the test of
an economic interest. See text accompanying notes 116-18 supra for a discussion of the
Court's treatment of this issue; Terminability of the contract rights, however, is a factor
associated with determining whether the first half of the test has been met. See text accom-
panying notes 126-29 supra for a discussion of the relationship of terminability to the eco-
nomic interest test.
190 See cases cited in note 121 supra for examples of decisions denying depletion de-
ductions to contract miners whose compensation was based on fixed sum payments.
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may have occurred in Swank, the result in the contract miner
cases is not obviously changed as a result of Swank. Contract
miners who are paid a fixed fee per ton will continue to fail the
second half of the Palmer v. Bender test which, as analyzed thus
far, remains viable only as the first part of a restructured defini-
tion suggested in this article.
Justice White's analysis of the effect of Swank is correct,
however, in an even broader sense than he intended. Based on a
policy-oriented analysis, the decision of the Court in Swank not
only effectively eliminated the necessity of satisfying the first half
of the Palmer v. Bender test, permitting instead an alternative
based on entrepreneurial involvement in the extraction of the
coal, but also compels a re-examination of the second half of the
Palmer v. Bender test, retained as the first half of the revised test
proposed in this article. The dissent in Swank suggests that the
majority's "focus on the marketing scheme as the test for deter-
mining whether a depletable allowance should be permitted is
far less sensible than the Service's duration of the lease require-
ment."''1 1 It may be, however, that neither focus is entirely ap-
propriate.
Swank clearly signals that the policy underlying percentage
depletion should be considered in determining entitlement to the
allowance. While the purpose of percentage depletion is clearly
to encourage the exploration, development, and extraction of
mineral resources, keying entitlement to the allowance to the sale
of the mineral is in theory inextricably linked to the outdated no-
tion that the depletion allowance is a provision solely for re-
covery of capital. That the taxpayer's income does not vary with
the market price of the natural resource should not therefore be a
talismanic key to denying entitlement to the depletion allow-
ance. Rather Swank recognizes that, from a policy perspective,
income received as a result of entrepreneurial participation in the
extraction of a mineral should be depletable, since such income
has been earned by conducting the activity that percentage de-
pletion is intended to encourage. Therefore, the test for an eco-
nomic interest should be satisfied if a taxpayer realizes a profit as
a result of the extraction of mineral and is entitled to receive that
191 101 S. Ct. at 1944 (White, J., dissenting).
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profit because of his entrepreneurial participation in the extrac-
tion. Profit resulting from the extraction of the mineral meets the
first half of the proposed test, and entrepreneurial participation
in the extraction meets the second half.
Under this theory many contract miners, including those in-
volved in Parsons v. Smith and Paragon Jewel Coal Co., should
be entitled to depletion. In many instances the contract miners
have clearly assumed an entrepreneurial role with respect to the
extraction of the coal. 92 They usually have a substantial invest-
192 For example, the contract between the lessee (Norma) and the strip miner (Re-
becca) in McCall v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 699, obligated the contract miner to:
(1) drive an entry into the seam at the designated place and to mine, by deep
mining methods, all coal in that seam over a certain thickness; (2) mine the
coal so as to produce the greatest quality of lump coal possible and deliver it
to the screening plant or tipple of Norma; (3) conduct all mining operations
in accord with the terms of the Youngstown lease, except as modified in the
May 1, 1950 contract; (4) do all necessary work and provide all necessary
materials, apparatus and labor for the mining operation; (5) produce a min-
imum of 50 tons of coal under normal conditions; (6) timber the mine and
repair old timbering; (7) keep in repair the road and roadways from the
mine to Norma's screening plant or tipple; (8) lay and construct all necessary
mining tracks; (9) keep the mine drained and free from obstructions; (10)
permit Norma to enter and inspect the premises; (11) comply with all min-
ing and other applicable laws, both state and federal; and (12) carry Work-
men's Compensation insurance and public liability insurance.
As consideration, Norma agreed to pay Rebecca $4.00 per short ton for
all coal mined and delivered, subject to change by mutual agreement, from
time to time, as the coal market fluctuated.
Id. at 700. It is obvious that the contract miner was bearing a substantial risk because he
had a large number of variable expenses which he might estimate, but of which he could
not be certain, in negotiating the price per ton.
In Commissioner v. Mammoth Coal Co., 229 F.2d 535, the owner was obligated
to pay the strip miner only if he accepted the coal, reserving the right to reject any coal,
upon which the miner was free to sell the rejected coal on its own account.
Substantial business risks were borne by the contract miner in Paragon Jewel
Coal Co. Although the miners were paid only upon delivery of the coal, they were re-
quired to open the drift mine tunnels. It often takes six to eight weeks to develop such a
mine to a point where it can be operated profitably. Furthermore, the nature of the coal
deposits involved was such that the tunnels often hit large outcroppings of rock, which had
to be removed before actual coal extraction could proceed. During this period, or when
they were required to pump water out of flooded mines, the contract miners received no
compensation, though they bore all of the expenses. Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 380 U.S. at 629-30.
See also Ramey v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. at 366-70; Denise Coal Co. v. Com-
missioner, 29 T.C. at 531-38.
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ment in equipment, 93 and they have assumed an economic risk
by dedicating, even temporarily, their equipment to mining.
Where underground mining is involved and the contract miner
bears the expense of developing the mine, the economic risk as-
sumed is even more obvious than where strip mining is involved
because of the considerably greater expense involved in opening
up an underground mine.9 4 Even in strip mining, however, the
contractor must generally construct roads and prepare the site 95
and may be required to acquire necessary surface and wheelage
rights.196 That development expenses are fully deductible' 9 and
equipment and improvements depreciable' should be irrel-
evant.'9 All of these activities reflect entrepreneurial involve-
193 See, e.g., Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. at 217, 219 (contract strip miners' invest-
ment in equipment as high as $250,000 and $500,000, respectively, in peak years); United
States v. Stallard, 273 F.2d 847 (contract strip miner utilized depreciable movable equip-
ment worth $370,000); Commissioner v. Hamill Coal Corp., 239 F.2d 347 (contract strip
miner purchased $103,000 worth of movable equipment, in addition to equipment al-
ready owned, to perform under contract).
194 See McCall v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d at 704-05.
195 See, e.g., Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. at 628 (contract
drift miners bore expenses of constructing tipple, power line, railroad siding and spurs,
and road, as well as purchases of processing equipment); Elm Dev. Co. v. Commissioner,
315 F.2d at 489 (contract drift miner constructed roads and benches, the costs of which
were currently deductible); United States v. Stallard, 273 F.2d 847 (contract strip miner
expended between $20,000 and $25,000 to construct roads); Denise Coal Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 271 F.2d at 939 (contract miner agreed to construct all roads and buildings neces-
sary for the mining, removal, and transportation of the coal to railroad cars); Commis-
sioner v. Hamill Coal Corp., 239 F.2d 347 (contract strip miner constructed tipple and
roads); Adkins v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. at 962 (drift miner bore all development and
mining costs including opening the mines, building supporting structures, such as fan
houses, powder houses, transformers, coal tipples, shoring, and roads).
196 Cf. Boiling v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. at 757 (lease subject to termination on 30
days notice). More frequently, the lessor or owner is obligated to acquire the surface and
wheelage rights. See, e.g., Beaver Dam Coal Co. v. United States, 370 F.2d 414 (6th Cir.
1966); Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. at 541-43.
197 I.R.C. § 616 (1976). See Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. at
631, The cost of acquisition of surface rights by an operator with no economic interest rep-
resents a deduction rather than a capital item to be recovered through depletion. Bolling
v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. at 764-65. See generally P. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note
138, at 20.01-.12.
18 I.R.C. § 167 (Supp. 1111979). See 380 U.S. at 631; Choate v. Commissioner, 324
U.S. 1 (1945). See also Whiteside & Jackson, The Coal Operator's Depletion and Depre-
ciation Deductions, OIL & GAS-NATURAL REsouRcEs (P-H) 2039, 2039.2 (1979).
199 See Eastern Coal Corp. v. Yoke, 67 F. Supp. at 174. This logic, however, was re-
jected in Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. at 225. Nevertheless, in this regard a contract miner is
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ment and can be distinguished from an employee or even a non-
entrepreneurial contractor, i.e., one who contracts to supply
only labor, using the lessee's or owner's equipment and with most
major nonlabor expenses borne by the lessee or owner. m
That the contract miner receives a fixed price per ton of min-
eral extracted should be of no consequence. The Swank interpre-
tation of Parsons v. Smith emphasizing the marketing risk is in-
appropriate. A lessee's or owner's risk of market fluctuations may
be illusory; he may face little or no risk of frequent fluctuations
where he has negotiated a long-term sales contract to sell coal at
a fixed price, subject to adjustment if his costs increase. 01 The
lessee in such circumstances may incur expenses related to the ex-
traction of the coal only after the risk of an inability to sell has
been eliminated.02 Furthermore, in some instances he has not in-
curred any capital costs in acquiring the rights to the coal since
no different from a lessee. Exploration and development expenses are currently deductible
by the lessee. Depreciation is claimed on all equipment and machinery and capital im-
provements. Expenditures for equipment necessary to maintain output because of reces-
sion of the working face of the mine are currently deductible if they neither increase the
value of the mine nor decrease the cost of production and do not restore exhaustion of
property for which a prior deduction has been allowed. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-2(a) (1960).
Because royalties paid to the lessor are excluded from the lessee's gross income, the lessee
has no capital investment to recover through depletion unless he has purchased the lease,
see Island Creek Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (C.C.H.) 727 (1962), or separate-
ly purchased surface rights, see Beaver Dam Coal Co. v. United States, 370 F.2d 414 (6th
Cir. 1966), or has paid the lessor a bonus. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a)(3) (1960). See also
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. United States, 347 F.2d 275 (Ct. CI. 1965) (per curiam) (dis-
cussing ordinary and necessary expenses of strip mining versus capital expenditures);
Geoghegan & Mathis Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 672 (1971), affd, 453 F.2d 1324 (6th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972) (reaching opposite result from Kennecott
Copper on similar facts).
2W The retention of engineering control by the lessee or owner should be irrelevant.
A lessee who operates a mine frequently does not have absolute engineering control; the
lease often requires the lessors approval of mining plans. Ross, Coal and Coal Leases, in
OFFICE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF LAW.
REPORT OF SEMINAR ON MINERAL LAW 8 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Coal and Coal
Leases].
201 See, e.g., Douglas Coal Co. v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 322; Eastern Coal
Corp. v. Yoke, 67 F. Supp. 166; Thornberry Constr. Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d 346;
Rev. Rul. 73-32, 1973-1 C.B. 301. Cf. Weirton Ice & Coal Supply Co. v. Commissioner,
231 F.2d at 535 (owner-operator transferred coal property to customer and became con-
tract miner to assure a profitable market for coal).
202 See, e.g., 576 F.2d 346; Rev. Rul. 73-32, 1973-1 C.B. at 301.
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royalties will be payable only as the coal is extracted and sold.2°3
To find that the lessee under such circumstances bears any sub-
stantial risks not often borne by contract miners is fictitious;
nevertheless, a lessee will be found to have an economic interest
under such circumstances.
It is equally fictitious to say that as a general rule only lessees
or owners may benefit from price fluctuations. Although it is
true that the contract price at which the lessee agrees to sell the
coal is related to the market price of coal at the time the long-
term contract is negotiated and executed, the fee received by the
contract miner also bears some relationship to the general level of
the market price at the time he commences work and sometimes
fluctuates with the price of coal.20 Even if the contract price does
not change with the market, as is also often the case, 2°0 that the
contract miner does not share in the market fluctuations should
not preclude an economic interest. The lessor of mineral property
frequently receives a fixed royalty per ton of mineral extracted
over the term of the lease,20 yet he has an economic interest de-
spite his insulation from market price fluctuations.N
203 See, e.g., Thomberry Constr. Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d 346. However, ad-
vance and minimum royalties are common in coal leases. Coggin, Federal Income Tax
Treatment of the Acquisition and Disposition of Coal Interests: An Examination of I.R. C.
§ 631(c), 82W. VA. L. Rxv. 1139, 1156 (1980).
204 See, e.g., Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. at 628 (fixed con-
tract price varied "depending somewhat on the general trend of the market price for the
coal over extended periods and to some extent on labor costs"); Constantino v. Commis-
sioner, 445 F.2d at 406 (contract miner was frequently paid more than contract price per
ton); McCall v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 699 (fixed contract price subject to change as
market price fluctuated); United States v. Stallard, 273 F.2d 847 (same); Adkins v. Com-
missioner, 51 T.C. 957 (contract price to be adjusted in comparable ratio to substantial
change in general price level); Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. at 532,535, 546
(fixed contract price subject to change if market price or lawful maximum price in-
creased).
M See, e.g., Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. at 217 (fix contract price adjusted for in-
creased labor and material costs pursuant to "understanding" of parties); Elm Dev. Co. v.
Commissioner, 315 F.2d at 489 (contract miner's fee increased if union wages increased);
Commissioner v. Mammoth Coal Co., 229 F.2d 535 (adjustment in price due to fluctua-
tions in wage levels); Ramey v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. at 374 (fixed contract price re-
mained unchanged for six years despite market fluctuations).
2 H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1951); Whiteside & Gillis, Coal and
Conservation- Tax Policy, 64 Ky. L.J. 573,582 (1975-76).
07 Sneed, supra note 53, at 335. See Cline v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 889 (1977),
affd, 617 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1980). Cline negotiated certain coal leases as an agent on be-
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Nor should contract miners fail the test because technically
they may look to the personal covenant of the owner or lessee for
payment rather than to the sale of the coal. This holding of Para-
gon Jewel Coal Co. is inconsistent with the reasoning of Swank.
In Swank, the Court gave scant attention to the lessee's lack of a
prospective legal right to extract the mineral, emphasizing in-
stead the expectations of the parties and their actual course of
conduct.0° The lessee or owner expects to pay the contract miner
out of proceeds from the sale of the coal, and the contract miner
expects to be paid from those proceeds. Thus, the contract miner
is in fact ultimately dependent upon the sale of the extracted coal
as the source of his income; if the lessee cannot sell the coal, the
contact miner might not be paid.2 °9 Furthermore, unless a royal-
ty holder takes his royalty in kind, he is in fact looking to the gen-
eral funds of the lessee for payment; there is no requirement for
the tracing of funds. Yet royalty payments have universally met
the second half of the Palmer v. Bender test.
Obviously, the effect of allowing depletion to the contract
miner would be to reduce the depletion allowable to the lessee or
owner. 21 Merely permitting the contract miner to deduct deple-
tion should not, however, subject the owner or lessee to section
631, since he remains a principal in the mining venture.21'
half of a principal in consideration of a fixed sum royalty per ton of coal extracted from the
leased properties. The Tax Court held that Cline had an economic interest with respect to
the royalty. With inflationary pressures, however, there is a greater trend for lessors to ne-
gotiate for percentage royalties in mineral industries such as coal which historically often
used fixed royalties. Coal and Coal Leases, supra note 200, at 6. Royalties with respect to
oil and gas properties, on the other hand, have usually been expressed as a percentage of
production or the proceeds from production.
28 101 S. Ct. at 1938-39.
M See Commissioner v. Mammoth Coal Co., 229 F.2d at 538-39. Contra Paragon
Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. at 635.
210 As a practical matter, the fee charged by contract miners may be generally re-
duced to reflect the lower tax burden on the contract miners and concomitant higher tax
burden on the lessee or owner. The bargaining process includes consideration of tax bene-
fits. Solocheck, Elements of Taxation: Depletion, in OFFICE OF CONTINUING LEGAL ED-
UCATION, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF LAW, REPORT OF SEMINAR ON MINERAL
LAw 56 (1976).
211 The provisions of § 631 do not apply to "income realized by any owner as a co-
adventurer, partner, or principal in the mining of... coal..., and the word 'owner'
means any person who owns an economic interest in coal.., in place, including a sub-
lessor." I.R.C. § 631(c) (Supp. III 1979). See Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner,
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Rather, the operation should simply be viewed as more in the na-
ture of a joint enterprise for the extraction and initial sale of the
mineral, with the responsibility for different phases of the oper-
ation allocated between the parties.2 12 Each party should then be
taxed on the income derived from the phase he conducts and
should be allowed depletion against that income .2 13
The owner or lessee of a mineral property mined by a con-
tract miner is not in a position analogous to the taxpayer in Bank-
line Oil Co., even though the lessee or owner is not actively en-
gaged in the total extraction process. A key element in Bankline
Oil Co. was the taxpayer's lack of control over production. In
most instances involving contract miners, however, the owner or
lessee retains control over the amount of production and mine
engineering.2 14 Furthermore, the owner or lessee originally had
control over the deposit. Thus, his position with respect to in-
come attributable to that control is analogous to that of the
holder of a royalty. To the extent that the first half of the Palmer
v. Bender test retains vitality as an alternative second test of the
restated definition, that test would be met. In addition, that por-
tion of his income attributable to the marketing of the extracted
mineral must also be viewed as an inextricable part of the mining
process, for without an initial sale there would be no purpose in
extracting the mineral. Therefore, income derived from partic-
380 U.S. at 635-37. See generally Coggin, Disposition of Coal Interests: Section 631(c), 29
TAx LAW. 95, 113-19 (1975).
212 This is analogous to the "joint efforts doctrine," under which the holder of a net
profits interest in oil and gas property obtained in exchange for services contributing to ex-
ploration and development of the property does not have income on receipt of the interest
and has a depletable economic interest in the oil in place. See Hambrick, supra note 78, at
21-28. See also Cline v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 889; Rev. Rul. 77-84, 1977-1 C.B. 173.
213 This was the taxpayer's argument in Wade v. Commissioner, 381 F.2d at 350,
which was rejected by the court on the grounds that Parsons v. Smith was controlling.
214 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Mammoth Coal Co., 229 F.2d at 538 (owner retained
power to suspend excavation operations); Weirton Ice & Coal Supply Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 231 F.2d at 533 (contract miner to mine and deliver such quantities of coal as
owner from time to time directed); Usibelli v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d at 540 (contract to
mine fixed tonnage); Ramey v. Commonwealth, 47 T.C. at 367-69 (retained engineering
control; option on output); Boiling v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. at 756-57 (retained en-
gineering control; option on output); McCall v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. at 676-78 (re-
tained engineering control; power to suspend operations and specify amount of coal to be
mined). Cf. Eastern Coal Corp. v. Yoke, 67 F. Supp. at 168 (contract for fixed tonnage to
be provided to sublessor by sublessee).
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ipation as a principal in an entrepreneurial capacity in the initial
sale of the mineral should also be depletable as having met the
first half of the restated definition.
B. Nonoperating Interests
Nonoperating economic interests should be unaffected by the
policy implications of Swank. Although Swank effectively dis-
penses with the necessity for control over the mineral deposit, it
does not totally negate the significance of control. A taxpayer
who would have met the Palmer v. Bender test for an economic
interest should also meet the restated test. Care must be exercised
in formulating the restated test, however, to avoid bringing
within the sweep of the new definition interests for which the
policy underpinnings of Swank do not warrant change in treat-
ment. It is for this reason that Swank should not be read as mere-
ly eliminating the first half of the Palmer v. Bender test or as re-
writing that definition in the disjunctive.
By dispensing with the need for capital interest in the min-
eral in place, Swank transmutes the second half of the Palmer v.
Bender test to one based upon the taxpayer's having a possibility
of profit solely from the extraction and sale of the mineral.21  If
the second half of the Palmer v. Bender test, as revised to com-
port with the theory of Swank, stood as the sole test for meeting
the definition of an economic interest, a taxpayer such as the one
in Helvering v. O'Donnell216 would meet that half of the test and
would therefore be entitled to depletion. Such a result should be
avoided in constructing the revised test for an economic inter-
est.217 Similarly, a processor in the position of the taxpayer in
Bankline Oil Co. would probably meet the first half of the re-
stated test. However, Swank does not warrant finding an eco-
nomic interest in a taxpayer in this position. 21 Although the tax-
215 See text accompanying notes 180-84 supra for a discussion of the factors leading
to this conclusion.
216 303 U.S. 370 (1938).
217 See text accompanying note 167 supra for a discussion of why the nature of the
taxpayer's interest in Helvering v. O'Donnell should not satisfy the requirements of an eco-
nomic interest.
218 Compare text accompanying note 170 supra with text at note 214 supra in regard
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payer in Bankline Oil Co. would have had no profit but for the
extraction and sale of the oil, his profit did not result from a con-
tribution to the extraction and sale. A processor derives his profit
from handling the extracted mineral, a crucial, if sometimes fac-
tually hazy, distinction.19 Incorporating in the definition of an
economic interest a requirement that the taxpayer's profit be de-
rived from a contribution to the extraction of the mineral is es-
sential to avoid unintentionally changing the result in cases such
as O'Donnell and Bankline Oil Co.
An absolute requirement of a contribution to the extraction,
however, might be interpreted to preclude nonoperating inter-
ests from the scope of the revised definition. To avoid this result,
an alternative test should be available. In determining what the
alternative should be, the thread of consistency in cases permit-
ting depletion against income accruing to nonoperating interests
provides the solution, i.e., that the holder of the interest current-
ly holds or at one time held control over the mineral deposit.20
This concept was embodied in the first half of the Palmer v.
Bender test, and retention of that concept as an alternative for
satisfying the second half of the restated definition will assure
consistent results in future cases regarding nonoperating inter-
ests.
The Supreme Court has had little difficulty in finding that
royalty holders also meet the second half of the traditional test;22'
royalty holders should, therefore, meet the first half of the re-
stated test. However, one must consider whether the first half of
the revised definition-the second half of the Palmer v. Bender
to the relative lack of control over production by the taxpayer in Banidine Oil Co. com-
pared to that exercised by the typical contract miner.
218 See text accompanying notes 73-78 supra for a discussion of this distinction. Com-
pare CBN Corp. v. United States, 364 F.2d 393 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (denying depletion deduc-
tion) with CBN Corp. v. United States, 328 F.2d 316 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (allowing depletion
deduction in prior year governed by same contract which governed in later decision).
M See text accompanying notes 53-84 supra for discussion of the importance of con-
trol in the development of the present economic interest test.
221 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308; Kirby Pe-
troleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (net profits interest); Palmer v. Bender, 287
U.S. 551; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103. The issue is barely discussed, if at all, since it is
self-apparent that a royalty meets the second half of the Palmer v. Bender test if the first
half has been met. Of course, this half of the test might not be met if there was an alterna-
tive source of payment. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404.
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test revised to reflect that the taxpayer is looking solely to extrac-
tion and sale of the mineral for his profit rather than for a return
of capital-will change the result in cases in which the taxpayer
met the first half of the Palmer v. Bender test but failed the sec-
ond half. In the context of nonoperating interests, the second half
of the Palmer v. Bender test has not been examined as closely as
the first half. Detailed analysis of the cases is unnecessary, how-
ever, due to the relatively minor change in regard to nonoperat-
ing interests which clearly have a capital interest in the mineral
in place. The change from "return of investment" to "profit" is to
achieve conformation to the restated first half of the test; no
change has been made in the requirement that the sole source of
income must be extraction of the mineral. Consequently, since
the key issue in testing nonoperating interests against the second
half of the Palmer v. Bender test has been the source of the re-
ceipt, 22 the revision should not affect the result in such cases.
Anderson v. Helvering223 is an illustrative case. The issue in
Anderson was whether payments from the transferee to the
transferor of certain mineral and fee interests were includible in
the gross income of the transferee. Payment was to be made
$50,000 in cash and $110,000 from one-half of the proceeds re-
ceived by the transferee from oil and gas production and from
the sale of the fee to any of the land transferred. The Court held
that all of the income was included in the transferee's gross in-
come. The transferor had no economic interest because he could
look for his payments to a source other than production: he might
instead be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the fee interest.
Under the revised definition, this limitation remains effective so
that the same result would be reached.
Where the sole source of the payments to the transferor is
clearly the proceeds of production, however, Anderson v. Hel-
vering would not be controlling and the issue must be deter-
mined by whether the transferor has retained an economic inter-
est. Unless the transferor has conveyed all or a fractional share of
his interest without retaining any continuing interest in produc-
tion, or unless section 636 applies, the transaction will be treated
222 See Sneed, supra note 53, at 318-34.
223 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
[Vol. 70
REDEFINING ECONOMIC INTEREST
as a lease and the source of the income therefore determined by
reference to principles applied to lessors.2A Under these prin-
ciples, the types of payments retained by a lessor are limited. A
lessor will generally receive only royalties, advance royalties,
bonuses, production payments, or delay rentals. Delay rentals
are in the nature of rents rather than royalties and are clearly not
depletable even if the lessor has retained an economic interest be-
cause the source of the payment was not the extraction and sale
of a mineral.2 On the other hand, an ordinary royalty interest
obviously meets this source requirement, and the same rule ap-
plies to advance royalties.22 A production payment is treated in
the same manner as a bonus payable in installments.2 7 Although
a bonus to a lessor does not reflect an economic interest under the
logic of Anderson v. Helvering because it is not necessarily pay-
able solely from the proceeds of the extraction and sale of the
mineral,22 bonuses have been treated as depletable income.M
From the lessee's point of view, the theoretically correct analysis,
requiring the lessee to include the bonus in gross income is fol-
lowed.m However, to prevent both the lessor and lessee from
claiming percentage depletion with respect to the same income,
224 See F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 138, at 3.02-.03. A conveyance of all or
a fractional portion of the transferor's interest without any continuing interest in produc-
tion is treated as a sale, which will normally generate capital gain under I.R.C. § 1231
(Supp. 1111979). A retained production payment on the sale of a mineral interest is treated
as a purchase money mortgage loan under I.R.C. § 636(b) (1976) and not as an economic
interest in the mineral property. The income from production used to satisfy the obliga-
tion is depletable ordinary income to the holder of the working interest.
225 Treas. Beg. § 1.612-3(c)(1) (1960).
226 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(b), T.D. 7523, 1978-1 C.B. 192, 194. If, however, the les-
see's right to extract the mineral is abandoned or terminated before extraction of an
amount of mineral attributable to the advance royalty paid, the lessor must restore to his
capital account the depletion deductions attributable to the unextracted mineral and in-
clude a corresponding amount in income for the year of termination or abandonment.
27 I.R.C. § 636(c) (1976).
228 See Baker, supra note 41, at 272.
229 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3, T.D. 7523, 1978-1 C.B. 192, 194. See Burnet v. Harmel,
287 U.S. 103.
230 See, e.g., Murphy Corp. v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Ark.), affd
per curiam, 337 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1964). Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a)(3) (1960) treats the
bonus as a capital investment made for the acquisition of a mineral interest, recoverable




the lessee must exclude the amount of the bonus from gross in-
come for purposes of computing percentage depletion.231
The revised definition of an economic interest proposed in
this article will not cause any change in these results. Clearly, all
of the payments reflecting a retained economic interest will meet
both the first half of the new test and the alternative of the
second half of the new test derived from the first half of the
Palmer v. Bender test. Conversely, the payments which do not
reflect a retained economic interest will fail the revised test be-
cause they are not made solely by reason of extraction and sale of
the mineral. Further, the inconsistent treatment of lease bonus
payments is well established by both regulation and precedent,
and its incongruity will similarly survive the revision of the def-
inition of an economic interest.
C. Broader Policy Perspectives
The Court's recognition in Swank that percentage depletion
serves an incentive policy goal and is not merely a cost recovery
method exacerbates the policy problem created by treating per-
centage depletion as a substitute for cost depletion, thereby effec-
tively denying actual recovery of capital expenses to taxpayers
who have incurred them.2 32 This is well illustrated by the situa-
ti6n of a lessee who has made a bonus payment. Although the les-
see must capitalize the bonus payment and recover it through de-
231 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-3(c)(5)(ii), T.D. 7261,1973-1 C.B. 309,317. It has been sug-
gested that the lessee should be permitted to exclude the amount of the bonus from gross
income for, all purposes to achieve consistent treatment. Canadian River Gas Co. v. Hig-
gins, 151 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J., dissenting); Hambrick, supra note 78, at
35.
232 See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. United States, 347 F.2d at 286 n.16 (per curiam)
(acquisition of surface rights necessitated by expansion of strip mine pit held deductible
operating expense, not capital expense recoverable only through depletion; taxpayer ar-
gued that because he had been claiming percentage depletion for many years and would
continue to do so, capitalization of expense would effectively deny recovery). See also
Miller, Percentage Depletion and the Level of Domestic Mineral Production, 15 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 241, 253 (1975) (arguing that percentage depletion discourages exploration in
the oil and gas industry because geological and geophysical expenses must be capitalized
and are recoverable only through depletion unless they do not result in the acquisition of
any property). For treatment of exploration expenses in the solid mineral industry, see
I.R.C. § 617 (1976) and F. BuRKE & B. BOWHAY, supra note 138, at 19.01-.11.
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pletion, the lessee in most instances elects percentage deple-
tion.21 Because percentage depletion is computed without refer-
ence to actual capital expenditures, he is effectively denied re-
covery of his capital expense. This can be simply illustrated by an
example. Assume Lessee A leases coal property from Lessor A for
ten years at a royalty of $1.00 per ton of coal extracted. Both par-
ties expect Lessee A to extract ten tons of coal per year. Lessee B
leases coal property from Lessor B for a bonus of $10.00 and a
royalty of $.90 per ton of coal extracted. Both parties expect Les-
see B to extract ten tons of coal per year. Assume that both lessees
incur $5.00 of operating costs in each year and sell ten tons of
coal at $2.00 per ton. Lessee A has gross income from mining for
purposes of computing percentage depletion of $10.00. Lessee B,
on the other hand, has gross income from mining of $11.00. The
taxable income of each would be computed as follows:
Lessee A Lessee B
Gross Income $10.00 $11.00
Less operating expenses 5.00 5.00
Taxable Income before Depletion 5.00 6.00
Percentage Depletion 1.00 1.10
Taxable Income 4.00 4.90
Despite the fact that at the end of the ten-year lease both lessees
would have identical aggregate, before-tax cash flow, Lessee A
would have less aggregate taxable income because Lessee B
would not be permitted to deduct the bonus payment, and his
election to claim percentage depletion would preclude cost re-
covery of the capitalized bonus payment. A similar result can oc-
cur whenever a taxpayer who has incurred actual capital ex-
penses against which cost depletion would be allowable elects
percentage depletion. 3 4
233 Miller, supra note 232, at 242.
234 See, e.g., Geoghegan & Mathis v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1324 (6th Cir. 1972),
affg 55 T.C. 672 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972) (disallowing deduction and re-
quiring capitalization of cost of land on which to relocate pipeline easement necessitated
by expansion of strip mine pit). Contra Cushing Stone Co. v. United States, 535 F.2d 27
(Ct. CL. 1976). Compare Manchester Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 577 with
Omer v. United States, 329 F.2d 393 (acquisition of surface rights in fee simple must be
capitalized and recovered through depletion but royalty payments for surface rights may
be excludable from gross income of lessee because depletable income to lessor).
1981-82]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
This disparity in treatment arises from the statutory pattern
which views percentage depletion as an alternative to cost deple-
tion. However, to treat percentage and cost depletion as mutual-
ly exclusive alternatives fails to recognize that percentage deple-
tion, to the extent it exceeds the.actual investment in the mineral
property, serves a function substantially unrelated to cost re-
covery. Although percentage depletion, because it frequently ex-
ceeds cost depletion, has been defended as providing an incentive
to exploration and development of mineral properties,2, treating
cost and percentage depletion as alternatives imposes a compet-
itive disadvantage in the form of a higher effective rate of tax-
ation for taxpayers who have incurred greater capital expenses
recoverable only through the depletion deduction.
Both equitable treatment and, assuming that percentage de-
pletion does in fact have an incentive effect,218 implementation of
the policy goals behind percentage depletion would be furthered
by permitting both cost depletion and a reduction in the effective
rate of taxation on income derived from the extraction of natural
resources presently effected by percentage depletion. Allowing
only actual cost depletion would restore the concept to its orig-
inal function, i.e., a cost recovery method akin to cost of goods
sold or depreciation. Allowing an exclusion of a certain percent-
235 E.g., R. CAMPBELL, PERCENTAGE DEPLETION AND EXPLORATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT COSTS, 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., TAX REVISION
COMPENDIUM 1041 (Comm. Print 1959); R. GONZALEZ, PERCENTAGE DEPLETION FOR PE-
TROLEUM PRODUCTION, 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., TAX RE-
VISION COMPENDIUM 985 (Comm. Print 1959); H. JACKSON, DEPLETION AND EXPLORATION
EXPENSES, 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., TAX REVISION COM-
PENDIUM 1027 (Comm. Print 1959); L. RANDALL, DEPLETION AND EXPLORATION AND DE-
VELOPMENT COSTS OF THE MINING INDUSTRY, 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1033 (Comm. Print 1959); Baker & Gris-
wold, supra note 43, at 361; McDonald, Percentage Depletion and the Allocation of Re-
sources: The Case of Oil and Gas, 14 NATL TAXJ. 323 (1961). Critics of percentage deple-
tion have frequently acknowledged that it results in the attraction of capital to extractive
industries and concomitantly greater production. E.g., P. STEINER, PERCENTAGE DEPLE-
TION AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION, 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 949 (Comm. Print 1959); Musgrave, Another Look at
Depletion, 15 NATL TAX J. 205 (1962). See generally AGRIA, Special Tax Treatment of
Mineral Industries, in THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 77-122 (A. Harbenger &
M. Bailey eds. 1969).
2' It has also been suggested that percentage depletion actually provides only a min-
imal incentive effect. Miller, supra note 232, at 241.
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age of the taxable income derived from the extraction and sale of
natural resources would provide the same incentive that percent-
age depletion currently provides. Thus, treating the two issues
separately will better assure horizontal equity for taxpayers en-
gaged in the extraction of natural resources. Further, revising the
structural relationship of cost depletion and the exclusion from
taxation of income affected by percentage depletion should
prompt re-examination of the relationship between the effective
rate of taxation on income from the extraction of natural re-
sources and the actual incentive to explore and develop natural
resources provided by beneficial rates, as well as the equitable
considerations inherent in permitting an advantageous rate of
taxation to a particular industry.217
CONCLUSION
The test of an economic interest originating in Palmer v.
Bender has traditionally consisted of two parts. First, the tax-
payer must have acquired by investment a capital interest in the
23 No attempt will be made here to present or argue either side of these issues. The
literature is replete with debates over the pros and cons of percentage depletion, both as to
efficacy and fairness. See, e.g., C. GALVIN, supra note 41, at 933; H. GAY, TAx REFORM
AND THE DEPLETION ALLOWANCE, 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess., TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 979 (Comm. Print 1979); J. MENGE, THE ROLE OF TAX-
ATION IN PROVIDING FOR DEPLETION OF MINERAL RESERVES, 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS &
MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 967 (Comm. Print 1959); P.
STEINER. supra note 235, at 949; Baker & Griswold, supra note 43, at 361; Davidson, The
Depletion Allowance Revisited, 10 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1970); Davidson, Public Policy
Problems of the Domestic Crude Industry, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 85 (1963); Hause, The Eco-
nomic Consequences of Percentage Depletion Allowances, 16 NArL TAX J. 405 (1963);
Kahn, The Combined Effects of Prorationing, the Depletion Allowance, and Import
Quotas on the Cost of Producing Crude Oil in the United States, 10 NAT. RES. J. 53 (1970);
Kahn, The Depletion Allowance in the Context of Cartelization, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 286
(1964); Mead, The System of Government Subsidies to the Oil Industry, 10 NAT. RE-
souRcESJ. 113 (1970); Miller, supra note 232, at 241.
There has already been a significant re-evaluation of the necessity for incentives
provided by percentage depletion with respect to oil and gas. The Tax Reduction Act of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12 § 501, 89 Stat. 47-53 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 613(b), 613A,
703(a)(2) (1976) as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §
190(a)(86)(A), 90 Stat. 1779, and the Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, §§
403(a)(2)(B), 403(b)(2), 92 Stat. 3202-04) repealed percentage depletion for all oil and gas




mineral in place. Second, the taxpayer must have secured income
derived solely from the extraction and sale of the mineral to
which he looked for a return of his investment. The courts have
long acknowledged that no actual investment was necessary to
satisfy the first half of the test; merely obtaining a capital interest
was sufficient. Accordingly, the second half of the test in reality
required not that the taxpayer look to the income for a return of
his investment, but that the extraction of the mineral that gave
rise to the investment reduce the value of his capital interest. The
test as so understood applied to all taxpayers having an economic
interest in mineral properties.
In United States v. Swank the Supreme Court effectively re-
wrote the Palmer v. Bender test of an economic interest, sub si-
lencio overturning the regulations incorporating that test. The
theory of the Swank decision eliminates the need for a capital in-
terest in the mineral in place and shifts the focus to an economic
interest in the profits from the extraction and sale of the mineral.
Primary attention is now directed to the second half of the test,
which must also be altered as a result of the elimination of the re-
quirement of a capital interest in the mineral in place. If no cap-
ital interest is necessary, the second half of the test cannot be
predicated upon a dimunution in the value of that capital inter-
est. Rather, the second half of the test must now relate to profits:
if the taxpayer looks solely to the extraction and sale of the min-
eral to make a profit, he may have an economic interest in the
mineral.
A function previously served by the first half of the test was
to limit depletion to those persons participating in extraction of
the mineral rather than those whose profit is dependent on the
extraction but who are not participating as operators or inves-
tors. This function can continue to be fulfilled by the second half
of the revised test if the requisite relationship between profit
from extraction and sale of the mineral and the taxpayer's contri-
bution to the extraction is more clearly delineated. The exis-
tence of the requisite relationship can be found if the taxpayer
meets either of two alternative tests. Both tests relate to the
source from which the taxpayer derived the income that meets
the first half of the test. The first alternative coincides with the
traditional first half of the Palmer v. Bender test, which should
[Vol. 70
REDEFINING ECONOMIC INTEREST
be shorn of its outdated "investment" element. Thus, if the tax-
payer derives income solely from the extraction and sale of a nat-
ural resource and his right to that income is derived from a cap-
ital interest in the mineral in place, he will have an economic in-
terest. Under this test, the results as to nonoperating interests
will not differ from those previously achieved through applica-
tion of the traditional test. Under the second alternative, a tax-
payer having income derived solely from the extraction and sale
of a natural resource should have an economic interest, even ab-
sent a capital interest in the mineral in place, if his right to the in-
come is attributable to his participation in the extraction and sale
in an entrepreneurial capacity. The major change wrought by
this alternative is that it would treat most contract miners as hav-
ing an economic interest entitling them to the depletion allow-
ance.
Swank's emphasis on the policy behind percentage depletion
and its conclusion that Congress could not have intended that
under certain facts no taxpayer would be entitled to depletion
calls for an even broader re-examination of the principles of de-
pletion. Totally freeing entitlement to percentage depletion from
any requirement of an investment or enforceable capital interest
in the mineral in the ground renders anomalous the statutory
patterns treating percentage and cost depletion as mutually ex-
clusive alternatives. Because the result in Swank was consistent
with the policy underlying percentage depletion, Congress
should re-examine the present relationship between cost and per-
centage depletion. In doing so, cost depletion should always be
allowed. Finally, if Congress concludes that it is appropriate to
continue to encourage the exploration and development of nat-
ural resources through a reduction of the effective rate of tax-
ation on income derived from their extraction and sale, it should
enact a provision granting such a tax benefit in addition to,
rather than in lieu of, cost depletion.
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